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ABSTRACT
Messaging Forensic Framework for Cybercrime Investigation
Farkhund Iqbal, Ph. D.
Concordia University, 2011
Online predators, botmasters, and terrorists abuse the Internet and associated web
technologies by conducting illegitimate activities such as bullying, phishing, and threat-
ening. These activities often involve online messages between a criminal and a victim, or
between criminals themselves. The forensic analysis of online messages to collect empir-
ical evidence that can be used to prosecute cybercriminals in a court of law is one way to
minimize most cybercrimes. The challenge is to develop innovative tools and techniques
to precisely analyze large volumes of suspicious online messages. We develop a forensic
analysis framework to help an investigator analyze the textual content of online messages
with two main objectives. First, we apply our novel authorship analysis techniques for
collecting patterns of authorial attributes to address the problem of anonymity in online
communication. Second, we apply the proposed knowledge discovery and semantic anal-
ysis techniques for identifying criminal networks and their illegal activities. The focus of
the framework is to collect creditable, intuitive, and interpretable evidence for both tech-
nical and non-technical professional experts including law enforcement personnel and
iii
jury members. To evaluate our proposed methods, we share our collaborative work with a
local law enforcement agency. The experimental result on real-life data suggests that the
presented forensic analysis framework is effective for cybercrime investigation.
iv
DEDICATION
To my parents who have always been affectionate to me,
To my wife, brothers, and sister who have been incredibly patient and supportive,
To my kids who have been giving me the strength through their sweet smiles.
v
Acknowledgements
I would like to make ‘SHUKR’ to my Beloved ALLAH, the most Merciful and Cherisher,
who created me and then showered me with his countless bounties.
I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Mourad Debbabi and Dr. Benjamin Fung
for their indispensable and incredible guidance. Prof. Debbabi gave me well-structured
research plan with clearly defined milestones while Dr. Fung helped me to precisely
meet the milestones. Our research objectives would not have been achieved without the
professional and experienced guidance and support of my supervisors.
My gratefulness extends to members of the examining committee including Dr. W.
K.-W. Cheung, Dr. A. Agarwal, Dr. O. Ormandjieva, and Dr. C. Y. Suen for critically
evaluating my thesis and giving me valuable feedback. My special thanks go to Hamad
BinSalleeh, Amine Boukhetouta, Khalid Sultan, Irshad Ali, Neharullah, and Omar Mery
for their nice company and encouragement. I extend my gratitude to members of our
Computer Security Laboratory and to the faculty members especially Dr. Amr Youssef
and Dr. A. Ben Hamza for their sincere advices. I am grateful to the staff members of
CIISE for their help and assistance during my stay at Concordia University.
Finally, I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to my beloved
parents, brothers, sister, my wife and my kids for their moral support and patience during




EMT E-mail Mining Toolkit
FP Frequent Patterns
WP Writeprint
SVM Support Vector Machine
DT Decision Tree
END Ensemble of Nested Dichotomies
NER Named Entity Recognition
NLP Natural Language Processing
DNA DeoxyriboNucleic Acid
WEKA Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis
RBFNetwork Radial Basis Function Network
BayesNet Bayesian Networks
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTML HyperText Markup Language
NB Naive Bayes
EM Expectation-Maximization
ARFF Attribute-Relation File Format
UBM Universal Background Model
vii
EER Equal Error Rate
DCF Cost Detection Function
kNN k-nearest neighbor
min_sup Minimum Support
DET Detection Error Trade-off
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic
IRC Internet Relay Chat
mDCF minimum Cost Detection Function
MSN Microsoft Network
DMNB Discriminative Multinomial Naive Bayes
SVM-SMO Support Vector Machine with Sequential Minimum Optimization








IDF Inverse Document Frequency
SRE Speaker Recognition Evaluation
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation and Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.1 Authorship Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1.2 Criminal Information Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Organization of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2 Related Work 17
2.1 Characteristics of Online Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 WEKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Authorship Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.1 Stylometric Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 Authorship Attribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Authorship Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.4 Authorship Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.5 Limitations of existing Authorship Techniques . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Criminal Information Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
ix
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3 Header-level Investigation 42
3.1 Statistical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Social Network Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Geographic Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Text Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4 Writeprint Mining for Authorship Attribution 53
4.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.1 Attribution without Stylistic Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1.2 Attribution with Stylistic Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Building Blocks of the Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2.1 Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.2 Feature Discretization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2.3 Frequent Stylometric Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2.4 Writeprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Proposed Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.1 AuthorMiner1: Attribution without Stylistic Variation . . . . . . 70
4.3.2 AuthorMiner2: Attribution with Stylistic Variation . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Experiments and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 AuthorMiner1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
x
4.4.2 AuthorMiner2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Authorship Attribution with Few Training Samples 94
5.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2.1 Preprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.2 Clustering by Stylometric Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2.3 Frequent Stylometric Pattern Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.4 Writeprint Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.5 Identifying Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.3 Experiments and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6 Authorship Characterization 113
6.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.2 Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2.1 Clustering Anonymous Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2.2 Extracting Writeprints from Sample Messages . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.2.3 Identifying Author Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.3 Experiments and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7 Authorship Verification 123
xi
7.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.2 Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.2.1 Verification by Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.2.2 Verification by Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.3 Experiments and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8 Criminal Information Mining 137
8.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.1.1 Subproblem: Clique Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.1.2 Subproblem: Concept Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.2 Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2.1 Clique Miner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2.2 Concept Miner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
8.2.3 Information Visualizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.3 Experiments and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9 Conclusion and Future Work 164
9.1 Thesis Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164




Appendix I: Function Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Appendix II: Gender-specific Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
xiii
FIGURES
1.1 Framework overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 A sample ARFF file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1 Statistics calculated for an e-mail dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 User model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Temporal model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Map viewer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 AuthorMiner1: Authorship identification without stylistic variation . . . . 56
4.2 AuthorMiner2: Authorship identification with stylistic variation . . . . . 57
4.3 Accuracy vs. Min_sup, No. of discretized intervals (Authors= 6,Messages=
20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Accuracy vs. No. of authors (Messages= 20, No. of discretized intervals
= 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Accuracy vs. No. of messages per author (Authors= 6, No. of discretized
intervals = 6, Min_sup= 0:1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.6 Experimental results of AuthorMiner2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7 Comparing AuthorMiner2 with existing techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 AuthorMinerSmall: Authorship identification with small training samples 95
5.2 F-measure vs. Feature type (Authors= 5,Messages= 40) . . . . . . . . 107
xiv
5.3 F-measure vs. No. of authors (Messages= 40, Features= T1+T2+T3+T4)109
5.4 F-measure vs. No. of messages per author (Authors = 5, Features =
T1+T2+T3+T4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5 AuthorMinerSmall: Accuracy vs. No. of authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.1 AuthorCharacterizer: Inferring characteristics of anonymous author . . . 114
6.2 Gender identification: Accuracy vs. No. of authors . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 Location identification: Accuracy vs. No. of authors . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.1 Overview of author verification approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.2 DET for author verification using classification techniques . . . . . . . . 134
7.3 DET for author verification using regression techniques . . . . . . . . . . 135
8.1 Framework overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.2 Detailed diagram of the proposed criminal information mining framework 146
8.3 A sample screen shot of the presented framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8.4 Effect of minimum support on number of cliques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
8.5 Efficiency [Execution time vs. Minimum support] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.6 Scalability [Execution time vs. Data size] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
xv
TABLES
4.1 Lexical and syntactic features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Structural and domain-specific features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Stylometric feature vectors (prior to discretization) . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Stylometric feature vectors (after discretization) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Message representation in terms of feature items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.6 Paired t test (a= 0:05, d f = 4, critical value t0:05;4 = 2:132) . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Clusters with member messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 Clustered messages after discretization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Frequent stylometric patterns for clusters C1,C2,C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.4 Writeprints for clusters C1,C2,C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.1 Experimental result for location identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.1 Verification scores of classification and regression methods . . . . . . . . 135
8.1 Vectors of entities representing chat sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143




Cybercriminals abuse the anonymity in online communication for conducting illegitimate
activities including phishing, spamming, identity theft, masquerade, threatening, and ha-
rassment. In phishing scams, for instance, scammers send out phishing messages and
create phishing websites to trick account holders into disclosing their sensitive account
information, such as account number and password. Similarly, the reputation systems
of online marketplaces, built by using customers’ feedback, is most often manipulated by
entering the system with multiple names (aliases) [5]. Terrorist groups and criminal gangs
use the Internet andWorldWideWeb for committing organized crimes such as armed rob-
bery, drug trafficking, and acts of terror [24, 90]. They use online messaging systems as
safe channels for their covert communication. The digital revolution has greatly simpli-
fied the ability to copy and distribute creative works, which has led to increased copyright
violation worldwide [110].
1
In most Internet-mediated crimes, the victimization tactics used vary from sim-
ple anonymity to identity theft and masquerade. In distributing unsolicited junk mail,
called spamming, for instance, a perpetrator attempts to hide his/her true identity, while
in phishing s/he may impersonate an officer of high authority. In predatory and bullying
chat conversation, a pedophile more likely pretends to be a teenager [52]. Similarly, in
web spoofing [27] a potential victim is tricked (through a bulk message) into uploading
personal information on a deceptive website. Likewise, in escrow fraud websites [28],
a fake seller creates a dummy online escrow service and then disappears after collecting
money from the buyers.
In this thesis, we develop a forensic analysis framework for analyzing online mes-
sages by integrating data mining algorithms, natural language processing techniques, and
social networking analysis techniques. The developed framework can be employed to
automatically perform a multi-stage analysis of suspicious online documents and present
the findings with objectivity and intuitiveness. The challenge is to collect evidence that is
creditable, intuitive, and is interpretable by both technical and non-technical professional
experts, i.e, law enforcement personnel or jury members. The analysis can be applied to
the header as well as the body of an online message.
Depicted in Figure 1.1, the header-content is analyzed to collect preliminary in-
formation about the general behavior of the users. The body-content or message body is
analyzed to collect forensically relevant information about the potential suspects and their
activities. The information extracted from the textual body of a message are used as inter-
nal evidence [64]. This thesis is focused on analyzing the message body. The term online
2
message is used throughout the thesis to represent the Internet-mediated communication
documents including e-mails, chat logs, blogs, and forum posts.
The analysis of header-content can help an investigator collect preliminary infor-
mation about the incident and thus can shape the process of an investigation. In the initial
phase of an investigation, given a suspicious dataset, e.g., an e-mail corpus, an investi-
gator may want to collect simple statistics such as e-mail distribution based on sender,
recipient, and the time at which a message is sent. Similarly, an investigator may want to
learn about the social behavior of the suspects within their communities and social groups
by applying social networking techniques. Furthermore, identifying the physical distribu-
tion of e-mail users may unveil important information leads. We achieve this functionality
by applying geographical localization and map retrieval techniques on the given message
collection.
Sometimes the task of an investigator would be to classify a given message to one of
the predefined topic categories. Most spam filtering and scanning systems are using topic-
or content-based classification techniques. We use some topic categories with example
documents to develop a classification model that is employed for identifying the topic of
new messages. Sometimes the task of an investigator would be to simply identify the
pertinent topics within a large collection of documents without having predefined topics.
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Figure 1.1: Framework overview
The presented framework analyzes the message body to: (1) collect traces of autho-
rial attributes for addressing the anonymity issue, called authorship analysis, and (2) ex-
tract forensically relevant information, called criminal information mining, from the tex-
tual content of online messages. Authorship analysis is applied to extract author-specific
features from the sample documents of a suspect to create his/her writeprint. The created
writeprint is the combination of stylistic features that are frequently found in the sample
documents of one suspect only and not in documents of other suspects. The proposed au-
thorship approach can be applied to authorship identification, authorship verification, and
authorship characterization problems (discussed in Section 1.1). Criminal information
mining is applied to extract knowledge about potential criminal entities and their illegal
activities from suspicious online documents. Finally, we use social networking techniques
to present the extracted information for further investigations.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents the motivation
and problem statement. Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, respectively, list the objectives and
contributions of the thesis. The structure of the thesis is given in Section 1.4.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Description
Installing antiviruses, filters, intrusion detection systems, and firewalls is not sufficient [104]
to secure online communication. Moreover, to identify the source of a malicious message,
an investigator usually needs to backtrack the IP addresses based on the information in
the header of the anonymous message. However, solely based on tracking the IP address
is insufficient to identify the suspect (e.g., the author of an anonymous message) if there
are multiple users on the computer that sent out the message, or if the message is sent
from a proxy server. In cases of hacked e-mail accounts and compromised computers, the
metadata contained in the header are forged and anonymized and thus cannot be trusted.
Similarly, monitoring chat rooms to detect possible predatory or bullying attacks by en-
tering suspicious chat forums with pseudo-victim ID is not a trivial task.
In this context, forensic analysis of online messages to collect empirical evidence
to prosecute an offender of a cybercrime by means of law is one way to minimize cyber-
crimes [104]. The large volume of online messages often contain enormous amount of
forensically relevant information about potential suspects and their illegitimate activities.
The existing tools, e.g., Forensic ToolKit [2], Encase [3], COPLINK solution suite [73],
and Paraben e-mail examiner [1] are some general-purpose analysis software and are not
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designed specifically for analyzing the textual contents of online messages. E-mail Min-
ing Toolkit (EMT) [102], on the other hand, is a free e-mail analysis software that com-
putes user behavioral models based on communication patterns. The toolkit is limited to
analyze e-mail documents only. The aforementioned tools do not have the functionality
of authorship analysis for resolving authorial disputes.
The challenge is to develop innovative tools and techniques that can be employed
to collect forensic evidence by analyzing both the header and the body of an online mes-
sage. The collected evidence needs to be not only precise but also intuitive, interpretable,
and traceable. Header-level information, e.g., IP addresses, host names, and sender and
recipient addresses, contained in an e-mail header; the user ID used in chatting: and the
screen names used in web-based communication help reveal information at the user or
application level. For instance, the header content extracted from a suspicious e-mail cor-
pus helps reveal who the senders and recipients are and how often they communicate,
how many types of communities there are in the dataset, and what are the inter- and intra-
community patterns of communication. The body of a message can be analyzed to collect
information about the potential authors and the perceived underlying semantics of the
written text [12].
In this section, we briefly discuss the motivations of the current study and identify
the challenges faced by an investigator in analyzing online documents. Most existing stud-
ies focus on investigating the header-content, while very few studies have been conducted
on analyzing the body-content. The focus of this thesis is to formulate problems and pro-
pose solutions in the area of content-level analysis. For header analysis, we implement
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existing state-of-the-art techniques including statistical analysis, geographical localiza-
tion, social network analysis, and text categorization methods. A detailed description of
these techniques is given in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
The textual content of a message is studied mainly from two perspectives: author-
ship analysis and criminal information mining. Authorship analysis is applied to address
the issue of anonymity in cybercrime investigation. Knowledge discovery or criminal
information mining techniques are applied to learn about the illegitimate activities of
cybercriminals. Therefore, we identify the motivations and research challenges in the
aforementioned two research areas and discuss them in the following sections.
1.1.1 Authorship Analysis
Most existing authorship studies employ classifiers to infer the author of anonymous doc-
uments. The classifiers, commonly used in these studies, fall into three main categories:
(1) probabilistic classifiers, e.g., Bayesian classifiers [91] and its variants; (2) decision
trees [87], e.g., C4.5 and J48; and (3) support vector machine [61] and its variants, e.g.,
Ensemble SVM. Each of these techniques has its own limitations in terms of classification
accuracy, scalability, and interpretability. An extensive survey on text categorization [96]
suggests that SVM outperforms most classifiers, such as decision tree methods [88, 89],
the probabilistic naive Bayes classifier, and batch linear classifiers (Rocchio).
Though support vector machine outperforms most classifiers including decision
trees in terms of accuracy, it is a black box approach and the results produced by this clas-
sifier are not interpretable. Therefore, it is not suitable for evidence collection. Decision
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trees, on the other hand, are symbolic and not quantitative and are therefore interpretable.
However, in building a decision tree, only the local information of a node is considered
and therefore it fails to capture the integrated effect of different features; thus, the results
are not very accurate.
The accuracy of most classifiers is subject to the size of data available for training.
However, in most cybercrime investigations the example data is hardly enough to train
a classifier. Similarly, most authorship studies focus on structured documents such as
books, which are relatively easy to analyze as compared to unstructured data such as
online messages.
We study authorship problem from the following four perspectives.
Authorship attribution. An investigator has a disputed anonymous online mes-
sage together with some potential suspects. The task of the investigator is to identify the
true author of the document in question by analyzing the sample documents of potential
suspects. Although existing authorship studies mention temporal and contextual variation
in the writing style of an author, they do not take them into consideration. In this thesis,
we address the problem of authorship attribution with and without a focus on the problem
of stylistic variation. The term stylistic variation is used to represent the temporal and
occasional change in the writing style of an individual.
Authorship identification with few training samples. In most real-world inves-
tigation problems, the number of sample documents is often insufficient for training a
classifier. In certain situations the available sample may be very small or there may be
no sample. In some cases, an investigator can ask a suspect to produce a sample of her
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writing by listening to a story or watching a movie and then reproducing the played scene
in his/her own writing. Clearly, the number of samples is very limited.
Authorship characterization. Sometimes a cybercrime investigator has no clue
about who the potential suspects are and therefore has no training samples. Yet, the
investigator would like to infer characteristics of the author(s), such as gender, age group,
and ethnic group, based on the writing styles in the anonymous messages. We assume the
investigator has access to some external source of text messages such as blog postings and
social network websites that disclose the authors’ public profiles. The challenge is how
to utilize such external sources to infer characteristics of the authors of the anonymous
messages.
Authorship verification. The problem is to confirm whether or not the given dis-
puted anonymous message is written by a given suspect. Some researchers treat verifica-
tion as a similarity detection problem in which the task is to determine if the two given
objects are produced by the same entity, without knowing explicitly about the entity. The
need is to first clearly define the problem of authorship verification and then propose a
solution.
The challenge is not only to address the aforementioned authorship problems but
also to support the findings with strong evidence for forensic purposes.
1.1.2 Criminal Information Mining
In the study of authorship analysis, the task is to extract the content-independent attributes,
called stylometric features, from the textual content of documents. On the other hand,
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in criminal information mining, the task is to analyze the content-specific words of the
documents to collect forensically relevant information. The extracted information can be
used to answer questions such as: What are the pertinent suspicious entities mentioned
within a document? Are these entities related to each other? What concepts and topics
are discussed in the documents?
Online documents can be analyzed to reveal information about suspicious entities
and their malicious activities. Identifying the semantic meaning of the written words
by applying contextual analysis and disambiguation techniques will help the investiga-
tor retrieve malicious documents. Understanding the perceived (semantic) meaning of
suspicious messages is not trivial due to the obfuscation and deception techniques used
by perpetrators in their online communication. For instance, the perceived meaning of
written words in a malicious discourse is different from their apparent meaning, as the
street names used for most illegitimate activities are borrowed from daily conversation.
The word ‘thunder’ means heroin and the word ‘snow’ means cocaine in e-mails used for
drug trafficking. There are more than 2300 street terms (used for drugs or drug-related
activities) available on http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov.
Predictive machine learning methods and natural language-processing techniques
are applied to extract this information. Named entity recognition [8] is employed to ex-
tract traces of information related to persons, locations, or objects. Social networking [24]
and link analysis techniques [95] are applied to identify covert associations between en-
tities. Similarly, topic identification or topic detection is employed to identify the topic
or genre of a document [9]. Text summarization techniques [14, 15, 32, 109] are usually
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employed to extract a summary of textual documents.
The limitations of most existing criminal information mining techniques are: (1)
Forensic tools and techniques, e.g., COPLINK solutions suite, are used to collect network-
level information, e.g., URL and host name, instead of analyzing the textual content of
the documents. (2) Most analysis techniques, designed for text classification and clus-
tering, consider only the frequency of words and not their semantics. (3) The proposed
approaches focus on structured data, i.e., formal reports, rather than unstructured data
such as chat logs and e-mail messages. (4) Most existing forensic tools are either de-
veloped for very high level analysis, e.g., FTK and Encase, or are limited in application
scope. For instance, E-mail Mining Toolkit and Paraben e-mail examiner do not address
the issue of anonymity.
The problem of criminal information mining is, to design an approach to automat-
ically perform a semantic analysis of textual content (usually large archives) of online
documents for collecting forensically relevant information. The extracted information
needs to be precise, creditable, and interpretable with a certain degree of acceptance. The
expert witness needs to present information in different levels of granularity to enhance
interpretability and intuitiveness.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this research is to develop a data mining framework for forensic
analysis of online documents by:
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• extracting patterns of authorial attributes to address three problems of authorship
analysis–authorship attribution, authorship characterization, and authorship verifi-
cation;
• mining criminal data to extract knowledge relevant to cybercrime investigation; and
• supporting the findings in terms of interpretability, intuitiveness, and preciseness.
1.3 Contributions
We have developed a set of methods to pursue our objectives and to fill the research gap
identified in the above mentioned problem scenarios. The contributions are summarized
under the following two main headings: authorship analysis and criminal information
mining.
Authorship Analysis
To overcome the limitations of existing authorship techniques, in this study we
introduce a novel approach of authorship analysis in which the author-specific writeprint
is extracted. To concisely model the writeprint of an individual we borrow the concept
of frequent pattern [7] from data mining to capture the combinations of features that
frequently occur in an individual’s online documents. Frequent pattern mining has been
proven to be a very successful data mining technique for finding hidden patterns in DNA
sequences, customer purchasing habits, security intrusions, and has been used in many
other applications of pattern recognition.
The extracted writeprint is applicable to most of the authorship analysis problems
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discussed in this thesis including authorship identification, characterization, and verifi-
cation. Similarly, our method can be employed on all kinds of online documents, e.g.,
e-mails and chat logs. The extracted writeprint is easy to interpret and understand as it is
simply the combination of stylometric features. It would be hard for an accused person
to rebut or deny charges because the findings can be traced in his/her sample documents.
Following are some of the major contributions of our proposed authorship approach.
• Frequent pattern-based writeprint: We precisely model the writeprint of a suspect
by employing the concept of frequent patterns [60]. Intuitively, the writeprint of a
suspect is the combination of stylistic features that are frequent in her text messages
but not in other suspects’ messages. To ensure the uniqueness of the writeprint
among the suspects, our approach ensures that any two writeprints among suspects
are disjoint, meaning they do not share any frequent pattern. This is the first work
that presents a data mining solution based on the frequent pattern-based writeprint
to address all three authorship analysis problems discussed in Section 1.1.1.
• Capturing stylistic variation: Our insight is that a person may have multiple writing
styles depending on the recipients and the context of a message. We present an
algorithm to precisely model the sub-writeprints of a suspect using the concept
of frequent patterns. Experimental results suggest that the identification of sub-
writeprints can improve the accuracy of authorship analysis. Most importantly, the
sub-writeprint reveals the fine-grained writing styles of an individual, which can be
valuable information for investigators or authorship analysis experts [50].
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• Analysis based on different training sample sizes: Traditional authorship analy-
sis methods often require a reasonably large volume of training samples in order
to build a classification model. Our proposed method is effective even if only a
few training samples exist. In case, no training sample is available, our approach
can infer the characteristics of the authors based on the stylometric features in the
anonymous text messages.
• Presentable evidence: A writeprint is a combination of stylometric features that are
frequently found in a suspect’s text messages. Given that the concept is easy to
understand, an investigator can present the writeprint and explain the finding in a
court of law. Some traditional authorship identification methods, such as SVM and
neural networks [104,121], do not share the same merit.
• Remove burden from investigator: One question frequently raised by cybercrime
investigators is how to determine the right set of stylometric features that should
be used for the authorship analysis case in hand. Adding unrelated stylometric
features can distort the accuracy of an analysis. Our notion of frequent pattern-
based writeprint resolves the problem because insignificant patterns are not frequent
and, therefore, do not appear in the writeprint. Thus, an investigator can simply add
all available stylometric features without worrying about degrading the quality.
• Stylometry-based clustering: Content-based clustering for dividing documents into
different groups has long been used. Our experimental results suggest that clus-
tering by stylometric features is a promising technique to group online messages
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written by the same person into one cluster. The notion of stylometry-based clus-
tering is applicable in most authorship analysis problems [58].
Criminal Information Mining
The contributions of our criminal information mining module are given below.
• Analyzing unstructured data: Most criminal information mining studies focus on
structured documents, e.g., police narratives [25]; our data mining framework is
designed for analyzing unstructured data, e.g., chat logs. Structured documents are
easy to analyze as they are large in size, formal in style and composition, and prop-
erly compiled following common syntactic and grammatical rules, as compared to
online messages, which are usually written in ‘para’ language.
• Topic identification without training data: The traditional topic identification tech-
niques generally determine the topic of a given document from a list of some pre-
defined topic categories. For this, the investigator is assumed to have sample doc-
uments for each category to train a classifier. Our approach does not require any
training data and can dynamically assign topic to a new document based solely on
its content.
• Semantic analysis: To effectively analyze the text discourse, we use the word simi-
larity as well as the relatedness measure, defined in WordNet in word clustering and
topic identification steps of our method. Our approach can disambiguate whether a
word is used in its normal meaning or in its malicious meaning.
• Adapting expert knowledge to the data mining process: A cybercrime investigator
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can employ a taxonomy of the street terms used for different crimes in our presented
approach to guide the analysis process. The taxonomy can be extracted from large
collections of criminal conversation.
1.4 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
current literature on the subjects that are related to the problems addressed in this thesis.
The literature review consists of two parts: authorship analysis and criminal information
mining. Chapter 3 describes the analysis techniques employed on the message header.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel approach of frequent pattern-based writeprint extraction for
addressing the problem of authorship attribution. We extend the approach to address the
attribution problem in the presence of stylistic variation. Chapter 5 defines a new scenario
of authorship identification in which very few training samples are available.
Chapter 6 studies the authorship characterization problem and proposes a technique
to infer the sociolinguistic attributes of the potential author of a given anonymous mes-
sage. Chapter 7 defines the authorship verification problem and proposes a method based
on the NIST speaker-recognition evaluation framework [72]. Chapter 8 discusses a crim-
inal information mining approach for analyzing the textual content of online messages.




In this chapter, we present a review of state-of-the-art techniques developed in the areas
of authorship analysis and criminal information mining. Authorship is studied in terms
of stylometric features and analysis techniques. The analysis techniques are further di-
vided into three groups for addressing the three subproblems, i.e., authorship attribution,
authorship characterization, and authorship verification. In the literature, criminal infor-
mation mining is studied under the topics of named entity recognition, link mining, text
summarization, and concept mining.
In the current study we provide a review of the main approaches proposed in each
of the aforesaid research areas, along with their shortfalls. To overcome the identified
shortfalls, we briefly discuss our proposed solution.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, we discuss the special char-
acteristics of online communication documents. In Section 2.2, we give a brief descrip-
tion of a data mining benchmark toolkit, Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis
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(WEKA) [111], used in many existing authorship classification studies. In Section 2.3,
we give a review of the commonly used stylometric features, authorship attribution tech-
niques, authorship characterization methods, and authorship verification approaches. Sec-
tion 2.4 reviews the different language processing and text mining techniques developed
for discovering criminal information. We conclude the chapter in Section 2.5.
2.1 Characteristics of Online Messages
Online documents or electronic discourses are written communications exchanged be-
tween people over the Internet. The mode of communication of online documents can
be synchronous, such as chat logs, or asynchronous, such as e-mail messages and web
forums [4]. Authorship analysis of online documents is more challenging than analyzing
traditional documents due to their special characteristics of size and composition [34].
According to [42], “Electronic discourse or online document is neither here nor there,
neither pure writing nor pure speech but somewhere in between.”
The traditional literary works such as books and essays are rich sources of learning
about the writing style of their authors. Because literary works are usually large in size
ranging from few paragraphs to several hundred pages. They are generally well-structured
in composition following definite syntactic and grammatical rules. Most traditional doc-
uments are written in formal way and are intended for a variety of readers. Moreover,
the availability of natural language-processing tools and techniques make it easy to im-
prove the quality of these documents by removing spelling and idiosyncratic mistakes.
The study of stylometric features has long been very successful in resolving ownership
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disputes over literary and conventional writings [74].
Online documents, on the other hand, are short in size, varying from a few words to
a few paragraphs, and often they do not follow definite syntactic and/or grammatical rules.
Therefore, it is hard to learn about the writing habits of their authors from such documents.
Ledger and Merriam [68], for instance, have established that authorship analysis results
would not be significant for texts containing fewer than 500 words. Moreover, online
documents are interactive, informal in style, and are usually written in ‘para’ language.
People usually do not pay attention to their spelling and grammatical mistakes. Therefore,
the analytical techniques that are successful in addressing authorship issues over literary
and historic works may not produce trustable results in the context of online document
analysis.
Electronic discourses such as e-mail documents do have certain properties that help
researchers compare individuals’ writing styles. One can find more e-mail documents
for analysis; every e-mail user writes, on the average, 6-10 e-mails per day. Similarly,
additional information contained in the header (e.g., time stamps), subject line, and/or
attachment(s), are helpful in learning about the writing style of a user. Moreover, e-mails
are rich in structural features, e.g., greetings, general layout, and the sender’s contact
information, that are powerful discriminators of writing styles [34].
2.2 WEKA
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) is a collection of state-of-the-
art machine learning algorithms and data processing tools used for solving data mining
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problems. WEKA has been developed at the University of Waikato in New Zealand. It
is written in Java and distributed under the terms of a general public license. Most of
the WEKA functionality can be used both from within the WEKA toolkit and outside the
toolkit, i.e., they can be called from a Java program.
WEKA provides extensive support for the whole process of data mining includ-
ing preparing data, constructing and evaluating learning algorithms, and visualizing the
input data, including results of the learning process. The WEKA includes methods for
most standard data mining problems: regression, classification, clustering, association
rule mining, and attribute selection.
Classification methods implemented in WEKA [111], namely Ensemble of Nested
Dichotomies (END) [44], J48 [87], Radial Basis Function Network (RBFNetwork) [18],
NaiveBayes [91], and BayesNet [82] are commonly used for authorship analysis. The
decision tree classifier C4.5 implemented in WEKA is denoted as J48. The three widely
used clustering algorithms, Expectation-Maximization (EM), k-means, and bisecting k-
means, are implemented in WEKA.
The WEKA native data file is the Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF). It is an
ASCII text file that describes a list of instances sharing a set of attributes. A sample
ARFF consists of two sections: the header and the data, as shown in Figure 2.1. The
header, called the data declaration section, contains names of attributes followed by their
type. The type of an attribute can be numeric (integer or real), nominal, string, or date, as
depicted in Figure 2.1.
The data section starts with the reserved word data preceded by the symbol ‘@’ and
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is followed by rows of attribute values. The attributes are ordered having a one-to-one
association with the attributes defined in the declaration section. Each row represents one
instance of the declared attributes. The missing values are denoted by a question mark
within the respective position in the row. Values of string and nominal attributes are case
sensitive.
Figure 2.1: A sample ARFF file
2.3 Authorship Analysis
Authorship analysis is the study of linguistic and computational characteristics of written
documents of individuals [13, 20]. Writing styles or specific writing traits extracted from
authors’ previously written documents can be used to differentiate one person from an-
other [77]. Writing styles are studied in terms of mainly four types of stylometric features:
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lexical, syntactic, structural, and content-specific. Analytical authorship techniques em-
ployed so far include univariate and multivariate statistics [21,43], machine learning pro-
cesses such as support vector machine and decision trees [33, 121], and frequent-patterns
mining [60].
Most previous contributions on authorship attribution are applications of text clas-
sification techniques [33]. The process starts by identifying a set of a person’s writing
style features of that are relatively common in most of her works. A classifier is trained
on the collected writing style features to build a model, which is then used to identify the
most plausible author of anonymous documents.
In the literature, the authorship problem is generally studied from the following
three perspectives [34, 60].
• Authorship attribution or identification is applied to an anonymous document to
determine the likelihood of a specific author by examining his previously known
documents.
• Authorship profiling or characterization is used to characterize authors based on
their background and demographic information including gender, education level,
and linguistic and cultural attachment.
• Similarity detection or authorship verification is used to detect plagiarism, copy-
right violation, or intellectual property theft. It is applied to determine whether or
not any given two pieces of anonymous work, e.g., textual online document, pro-
gram code, or algorithm, are produced by the same entity [49].
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The related work of the aforementioned three aspects of authorship analysis is preceded
by a literature review of the stylometric features employed in authorship studies.
2.3.1 Stylometric Features
In traditional criminal investigation cases fingerprints are used to uniquely identify crim-
inals. In the present era of the computer and World Wide Web, the nature of most crimes
and the tools used to commit crimes have changed. Traditional tools and techniques may
no longer be applicable in prosecuting cybercriminals in a court of law. The statistical
study of stylometric features, called stylometry, shows that individuals can be identified
by their relatively consistent writing styles. The writing style of an individual is defined in
terms of word usage, selection of special characters, composition of sentences and para-
graphs, and organization of sentences into paragraphs and paragraphs into documents.
Rudman has identified more than 1000 stylometric features in his study [92]. But
there is no such feature set that is optimized and equally applicable to all people and in all
domains. However, previous authorship studies [13,20,34,122] contain lexical, syntactic,
structural, and content-specific features. Other features studied in authorship literature
include idiosyncracies [4], n-grams (e.g., bigrams and trigrams), and frequency of part-
of-speech tags [11]. Brief description and the relative discriminating capability of the
main feature types are given below.
• Lexical features are used to learn about an individual’s preferred use of isolated
characters and words. These include frequency of individual letters of alphabets
(26 letters of English), total number of upper case letters, capital letters used in the
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beginning of sentences, average number of characters per word, and average num-
ber of characters per sentence. The use of such features indicates an individual’s
preference for certain special characters or symbols or the preferred choice of se-
lecting certain units. For instance, some people prefer to use the ‘$’ symbol instead
of the word ‘dollar’, ‘%’ for ‘percent’, and ‘#’ instead of writing the word ‘number.’
Word-based lexical features, including word length distribution, words per sen-
tence, and vocabulary richness, were very effective in earlier authorship studies [56,
116,117]. Recent studies on e-mail authorship analysis [34,121] indicate that word-
based stylometry such as vocabulary richness is not very effective for two reasons.
First, e-mail messages and online documents are very short compared to literary
and poetry works. Second, word-oriented features are mostly context dependent
and can be consciously controlled by people.
• Syntactic features include content-independent all-purpose words, e.g., ‘though’,
‘where’, and ‘your’; punctuation, e.g., ‘!’ and ‘:’; and part-of-speech tags. Mosteller
and Wallace [78] were the first to show the effectiveness of the function words in
addressing the issue of Federalist Papers [116]. Burrows [20] used 30-50 typical
function words for authorship attribution. Subsequent studies [13] have validated
the discriminating power of punctuation and function words. Zheng et al. [121]
used more than 150 function words. Stamatatos et al. [100] used frequencies of
part-of-speech tags, passive account, and nominalization count for authorship anal-
ysis and document genre identification.
• Structural features are helpful to learn how an individual organizes the layout and
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structure of his/her documents. For instance, how are sentences organized within
paragraphs, and paragraphs within documents? Structural features were first sug-
gested by de Vel et al. [29, 34] for e-mail authorship attribution. In addition to the
general structural features, they used features specific to e-mails such as the pres-
ence/absence of greetings and farewell remarks and their position within the e-mail
body. Moreover, within e-mails some people use first/last name as a signature while
others prefer to include their job title and mailing address as well. Malicious e-mails
contain no signatures and in some cases may contain fake signatures.
• Content-specific features are used to characterize certain activities, discussion fo-
rums, or interest groups by a few keywords or terms. For instance, people involved
in cybercrimes (spamming, phishing, and intellectual property theft) commonly use
(street words) ‘sexy’, ‘snow’, ‘download’, ‘click here’, and ‘safe’, etc. Usually term
taxonomy built for one domain is not applicable in other domain and can even vary
from person to person in the same domain. Zheng et al. [121] used around 11
keywords (such as ‘sexy’, ‘for sale’, and ‘obo’) from the cybercrime taxonomy in
authorship analysis experimentations. A more comprehensive list of stylistic fea-
tures including idiosyncratic features was used in [4].
• Idiosyncratic features include common spelling mistakes, e.g., transcribing ‘f’ in-
stead of ‘ph’ (as in the word phishing) and grammatical mistakes, e.g., writing
sentences with the incorrect form of verbs. The list of such characteristics varies
from person to person and is difficult to control. Gamon [47] achieved high ac-
curacy by combining certain features including part-of-speech trigrams, function
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word frequencies, and features derived from semantic graphs.
2.3.2 Authorship Attribution
The problem of authorship attribution or authorship identification in the context of online
documents is to identify the true author of a disputed anonymous document. In foren-
sic science an individual can be uniquely identified by his/her fingerprint. Likewise, in
cyber forensics, an investigator would like to identify the specific writing styles, called
wordprint or writeprint, of potential suspects and then use them to develop a model. The
writeprint of a suspect is extracted from her previously written documents. The model is
applied to the disputed document to identify its true author among the suspects. In foren-
sic analysis the investigator is required to support her findings by convincing arguments
in a court of law.
In the literature, authorship identification is considered as a text categorization or
text classification problem. The process starts by data cleaning followed by feature ex-
traction and normalization. Each document of a suspect is converted into a feature vector
using vector space model representation [94]; the suspect represents the class label. The
feature values are calculated by using the five commonly used stylometric features dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. The extracted features are bifurcated into two groups, training and
testing sets. The training set is used to develop a classification model while the testing
set is used to validate the developed model by assuming the class labels are not known.
Common classifiers include decision tree [87], neural networks [70], and support vector
machine [61].
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If the error approximation is below a certain acceptable threshold, the model is em-
ployed. The disputed anonymous document is preprocessed and converted into a feature
vector in a manner similar to the one adopted for known documents. Using the developed
model, the conceivable class label of the unseen document is identified. The class label
indicates the author of the document in question. Usually, the larger the training set the
better the accuracy of the model. The accuracy of the model is gauged by employing the
popular functions called precision and recall, described in [78].
The difference between traditional text classification and authorship classification
is that in text categorization syntactic features, e.g., punctuation, all-purpose stop words,
and spaces, are dropped and the features list includes topic-dependent words, while in au-
thorship problems, topic words or content-dependent words are removed and the features
are calculated in terms of style markers or syntactic features. Similarly, in text categoriza-
tion problems the class label is the topic title among the predefined document categories,
while in authorship attribution the class label is the author of the document.
Most authorship attribution studies differ in terms of the stylometric features used
and the type of classifiers employed. For instance, Teng et al. [104] and de Vel [33]
applied SVM classification model over a set of stylistic and structural features for e-mail
authorship attribution. de Vel et al. [34] and Corney et al. [29] applied SVM on an e-
mail dataset and discovered the usefulness of structural features for e-mail authorship
attribution. They have also studied the effects of varying the number of authors and
sample size on the attribution accuracy.
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Zheng et al. [121, 122] and Li et al. [69] used a comprehensive set of lexical, syn-
tactic, and structural features including 10-11 content-specific keywords. They used three
classifiers including C4.5, neural networks, and SVM for authorship identification of on-
line documents written in English and Chinese languages. Van Halteren [107] used a set
of linguistic features for authorship attribution of students essays. In [65], different classi-
fiers were evaluated for authorship identification of chat logs. Zhao and Zobel [120] have
studied the effectiveness of function words in authorship problems by applying different
classifiers.
de Vel [34] found that by increasing the number of function words from 122 to 320,
the performance of SVM drops, due to the scalability problem of SVM. This result also
illustrates that adding more features does not necessarily improve accuracy. In contrast,
the focus of this thesis is to identify the combinations of key features that can differen-
tiate the writing styles of different suspects and filter out the useless features that do not
contribute towards authorship identification.
Some research proposals [34, 35] have recognized the contextual and temporal
change in the writing style of a person, although most choose to ignore such variations and
focus on obtaining the permanent writing traits of an individual. Therefore, they extract
stylometric features from the entire sample dataset of a suspect, disregarding the context
and the type of recipient of a message. In fact, the writing style of an individual varies
from recipient to recipient and evolves with the passage of time and with the context in
which a message is written [34].
Style variation is a factor of the commonly used four types of writing style features.
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For example, the change in the topic of an online message is indicated by the relative
composition of words and phrases. Official messages may contain more formal words
and phrases that may result in an increased value of vocabulary richness. Similarly, syn-
tactical features, including punctuation, hyphenation, and distribution of function words,
are usually more frequent in online text written to the top management of a company.
Moreover, the ratio of spelling and grammatical mistakes is usually higher in elec-
tronic discourse sent to a friend than to a co-worker. More specifically malicious e-mails
may not contain the signatures and contact information. Instead, malicious messages may
contain more fancy and charming words that are appealing and attractive to the target vic-
tims. Words like ‘congratulations!’, ‘hurry up’, ‘free download’ and ‘obo’ are commonly
found in spamming messages.
Similarly, the content and writing styles found in illegitimate messages are over-
shadowed by regular messages as the malicious messages are usually much fewer in num-
ber than regular messages. The analytical techniques employed over such intermingled
writing samples would produce misleading results. In the current study we propose tech-
niques for capturing the stylistic variation of a suspect to improve the attribution accuracy.
2.3.3 Authorship Characterization
Authorship characterization [29, 64] is applied to collect sociolinguistic attributes such
as gender, age, occupation, and educational level, of the potential author of an anony-
mous document. In the literature, authorship characterization is addressed as a text clas-
sification problem. Generally, a classification model is developed by using the textual
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documents previously written by the sample population. The developed model is applied
to the anonymous document to infer the sociolinguistic characteristics of the potential
anonymous author.
Corney et al. [29], Koppel et al. [63, 64], and Argamon et al. [12] studied the ef-
fects of gender-preferential attributes on authorship analysis. Other profiling studies have
discussed educational level [29], age, language background [64], and so on. To address
the same issue in the context of chat dataset, some techniques have been proposed in [65]
for predicting the potential author of a chat conversation. The proposed technique is em-
ployed to collect sociolinguistic and demographic information such as gender, age, and
occupation of the writer of an anonymous chat segment.
Abbasi and Chen [5] applied similarity detection techniques on customer feedback
to identify fake entities in the online marketplace. In [29, 64], authorship profiling was
applied to collect demographic and sociolinguistic attributes of the potential author of a
disputed document.
Existing characterization studies vary in terms of type of classifiers used, dimension
of characteristics inferred, and nature of documents analyzed. For instance, Corney et
al. [29] and de Vel et al. [36] used support vector machine to infer the gender, educational
level, and language background of an e-mail dataset. Koppel et al. [64] applied Bayesian
regression function to predict the gender, age, and native language of the perceived author
of anonymous text.
Most characterization studies are based on classifiers, which are not suited for
forensic analysis due to some limitations, discussed in Section 2.3.5. Our method is
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founded on frequent pattern-based writeprint extraction, representing the unique writing
style of an individual. Unlike traditional techniques, our method does not require large
training data for producing trustable results. Similarly, the proposed approach can be ap-
plied to most text discourses, although the current study is focused on a blog dataset. The
class dimensions of the authors include gender and region.
2.3.4 Authorship Verification
Unlike authorship attribution and authorship characterization, where the problem is clearly
defined, there is no consensus on how to precisely define the problem in authorship ver-
ification studies. Some studies, e.g., [4, 33], have considered it as a similarity detection
problem: to determine whether two given objects are produced by the same entity or not,
without knowing the actual entity.
Internet-based reputation systems, used in online markets, are manipulated by us-
ing multiple aliases of the same individual. Novak et al. [79] proposed a new algorithm
to identify when two aliases belong to the same individual, while preserving privacy. The
technique has been successfully applied to postings of different bulletin boards, achieving
more than 90% accuracy. To address the same issue of similarity detection, Abbasi and
Chen [4,5] proposed a novel technique called writeprints for authorship identification and
similarity detection. They used an extended feature list including idiosyncratic features
in their experimentations. In similarity detection, they took an anonymous entity, com-
pared it with all other entities, and then calculated a score. If the score is above a certain
predefined value, the entity in hand is clustered with the matched entity.
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Following the same notion of verification, Halteren [107] proposed a relatively dif-
ferent approach called linguistic profiling. In this study he proposed some distance and
scoring functions for creating profiles for a group of example data. The average feature
counts for each author was compared with a general stylistic profile built from the training
samples of widely selected authors. The study focused on detecting similarity between
student essays for plagiarism and identity theft.
The more common notion of authorship verification is to confirm whether or not
the suspect is the author of a disputed anonymous text. Some studies address authorship
verification as a one-class classification problem (e.g., [120] and [71]) while others (e.g.,
[63] and [64]) as a two-class text classification problem. For instance, Manevitz et al. [71]
investigated the problem as follows: Given a disputed document together with sample
documents of the potential suspect, the task is to verify whether or not a given document is
written by the suspect in question. Documents written by sample population are labeled as
‘outlier’ in their study. A classification model is developed using the stylometric features
extracted from the collected documents. The built model is applied to identify the class
label of the given anonymous document.
A slightly modified version of the one-class approach called ‘imposter’ is the two-
class problem proposed by Koppel et al. [63]. According to this study, the known doc-
uments of the potential suspect are labeled as ‘S’ and that of the sample population as
‘imposter’. A classification model is developed using the stylometric features extracted
from these documents. The anonymous document is divided into different chunks and
each chunk is given to the model to predict its class. The method fails to work if the
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documents of the ‘imposter’ and the suspect are closely similar.
An opposite approach would be to train one model for S and for not-S and then
employ a trained model to determine the degree of dissimilarity between them [64]. In
this study the authors employed the traditional 10-fold cross-validation approach. If the
validation accuracy is high, it is concluded that S did not write the document in question.
Otherwise the model fails to assign a class label.
A relatively new approach, called ‘unmasking’ [64], is the extension of the ‘im-
poster’ method. In this study the authors attempted to quantify the dissimilarity between
the documents of the suspect and that of the ‘imposter.’ The experimental results reported
indicate that for achieving trustable results the method is suitable in situations where the
document in question is at least 5000 words long. This is nearly impossible in the case of
online documents.
In this thesis we address authorship verification as a two-class classification prob-
lem. We develop a universal background model (UBM) by using documents from a large
population. We borrow the techniques from the SRE framework [72] to train and validate
the representative model. The SRE framework is very successful in the speaker recogni-
tion community. Similarly, evaluation measures such as DCF, minDCF, and EER, used in
the aforesaid framework, are suited for forensic studies.
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2.3.5 Limitations of existing Authorship Techniques
Most of the existing authorship analysis techniques are primarily based on some com-
monly used classifiers. These classifiers can be broadly divided into three main cate-
gories: probabilistic [91], decision trees [88, 89], and support vector machine [30]. Each
of these classifiers has its own limitations in terms of classification accuracy, scalabil-
ity, and interpretability. Probabilistic Naive Bayes classifiers and batch linear classifiers
(Rocchio) seem to be the worst of the learning-based classifiers, while SVM appears to
be the best in terms of classification accuracy [96].
Similarly, while building a decision tree a decision node is constructed by simply
considering the local information of one attribute; therefore, it fails to capture the com-
bined effect of several features. In contrast, SVM avoids such a problem by considering
all features when a hyperplane is created. However, SVM is like a black-box function that
takes some input, i.e., a malicious message, and provides an output, i.e., the author. It fails
to provide an intuitive explanation of how it arrives at a certain conclusion. Therefore,
SVM may not be the best choice in the context of forensic investigation, where collecting
credible evidence is one of the primary objectives.
Most classifiers would require sufficiently large training data to produce acceptable
classification accuracies. The collected training samples from the suspects in criminal in-
vestigation cases are not always enough to train a classifier. Therefore, the need is to de-
sign an approach that can work even with small training data. Similarly, most authorship
techniques that are successful in resolving authorial disputes of structured documents,
e.g., books and formal reports, may not produce trustable results in the context of online
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messages due to their short size and casual content.
To overcome the limitations of existing authorship techniques, we develop a novel
approach of authorship analysis. In this method, we create a unique writeprint for each
suspect based on her previously written documents. The concept of writeprint is based
on the idea of frequent pattern [7], a data mining technique. Frequent-pattern mining
has been very successful in finding interesting patterns in large archives of documents
analyzed for identification of customer purchasing habits, cataloguing objects in large
super stores, intrusion detection systems, and traffic classification.
2.4 Criminal Information Mining
The textual content of a document can be analyzed to collect forensically relevant infor-
mation that can be used to answer the following questions: Who is the potential author
of a text discourse? What are the pertinent suspicious entities mentioned within a docu-
ment? Are these entities related to each other? What concepts and topics are discussed
in the document(s)? [12]. Predictive machine learning measures and natural language
processing techniques are applied to extract information. Authorship analysis techniques
are used to learn about the potential author of an anonymous discourse [60]. Social net-
working [24] and link analysis techniques [95] are applied to identify covert association
between crime entities. Similarly, topic identification or topic detection is employed to
identify the topic or genre of a document [9]. Text summarization methods [14,15,32,109]
are applied to extract the summary of a potentially large collection of documents.
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Detailed description of the aforementioned areas is given in the following para-
graphs.
Zheng et al. [121,122] developed an authorship analysis framework for identifying
the true author of anonymous online documents. They built a classification model based
on the previously written documents of potential suspects, and then employed the model
to identify the true author of a given disputed document. Using a similar approach, in [65]
the authors proposed authorship attribution techniques for chat dataset. In [29,64], author-
ship profiling was applied to text documents to collect demographic and sociolinguistic
attributes (e.g., gender, age, and occupation) of the potential author of a disputed docu-
ment. Abbasi and Chen [5] applied similarity detection techniques on customer feedback
to identify fake entities in an online marketplace. In most of these studies the classifi-
cation models used are: (1) probabilistic classifiers (e.g., Bayesian classifiers [91] and
its variants), (2) decision trees [87], and (3) support vector machine (SVM) [61] and its
variants.
Named Entity Recognition (NER), a branch of natural language processing, is used
to identify information associated with an entity, such as the name of a person, place, or
company; contact information such as phone, e-mail, or URL; or other attributes such
as date-of-birth, vehicle number, or assurance number [26]. Chen et al. [24] employed
named entity recognition techniques for extracting criminal identities from police narra-
tives and other suspicious online documents. Minkov et al. [76] proposed techniques for
extracting a named entity from informal documents including e-mail messages. Some-
times cybercriminals use identity deception tactics to falsify their true identities. Wang
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et al. [108] proposed an adaptive detection algorithm for detecting masqueraded criminal
identities. Carvalho and Cohen [22] studied techniques for identifying user signatures and
the ‘reply part’ from the e-mail body.
To facilitate crime investigation process, Chau et al. [95] applied new link anal-
ysis techniques to the Tucson police department database to identify covert association
between crime entities. The proposed techniques, including shortest path algorithm, co-
occurrence analysis, and a heuristic approach, have been successful in identifying associ-
ations and determining their importance. The study [23] applied association rules mining
techniques to suspicious web sites, called dark web, for identifying online communication
between those accused of the 9/11 attacks.
Topic identification, within a corpus of text documents, is the extraction of pertinent
content related to a known topic or the topic to be listed [9]. In the literature of information
retrieval and browsing, topic identification is generally addressed either in a supervised
way or an unsupervised way [85]. In the supervised way, the problem of topic discovery
is handled as a text classification or text categorization problem [96]. According to this
approach, usually there exit some predefined topic categories with example documents
for each category. To infer the topic of an unknown document, a classification model is
developed on the given sample documents. Similarly, unsupervised learning or clustering
is applied to identify the pertinent groups of objects based on some similarity measure.
Pendar [83] has applied automatic text categorization techniques on suspicious chat
conversation to identify online sexual predators. Each given chat session is converted
into a vector of attributes using bag-of-words model. Attributes are the frequencies of
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word unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams. The words that appear either very rarely (say
once) or very frequently (say above 95%) in a given chat log are deleted. They develop
a classification model by applying SVM and k-NN classifiers on some previously known
predators’ chat conversations. The developed model is then employed to identify the
predator (or pseudo-predator) communication from a teenager (i.e., a victim) communi-
cation. Elnahrawy [40] compared the performance of three classifiers, i.e., Naive Bayes,
SVM, and K-nearest neighbor, for automatically monitoring chat conversation following
the general text categorization approach. Studies [39, 62, 80] focused on topic identifica-
tion of chat logs from a list of some predefined topics. Zhang et al. [119] have developed
text classification techniques for automatic key phrase extraction in Web documents.
The unsupervised topic identification or topic discovery is achieved by applying
content-based clustering. Clustering is used to uncover useful and interesting text patterns
in a corpus without knowing any background knowledge [85]. Once each document is
converted into term vector and the pairwise distance between the term vectors is defined,
a clustering algorithm is applied to divide the documents into groups. The documents of
a cluster are similar together and are dissimilar from documents of other clusters. Once
the documents are clustered, each cluster is labeled with the topic words. The topic words
or the cluster label is identified by using different techniques. The simplest way is to
identify the words that are found frequently with a particular cluster. There are two main
categories of clustering algorithms: partitioned or hierarchial. In hierarchial clustering,
documents are diagramed into a tree-like structure called a dendrogram [31]. Topics at the
top level are more general, becoming more specific while descending toward the terminal
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nodes. The documents associated to each topic are linked to that node.
In [113], the specific attributes of chat users and the relation between users within
a chat room are visually displayed. The authors used metaphors for creating visual data
portraits of the attributes extracted from chat content and the patterns of conversation of
users. Example of attributes are: time since initial posting, participation frequency of a
user in a chat room or in a topic, and number of responses to a posting. Bingham et al. [16]
developed a chat analysis tool, called ChatTrack, for summarizing and filtering chat logs.
A classifier is trained on a set of predefined concepts or topics with sample documents.
The classifier then creates a vector of high frequency words for each topic category. Next,
a conceptual profile is created for a selected chat conversation or chat user by training a
classifier on the selected chat sessions. The trained classifier is used to create a vector of
selected words. Finally, using the cosine similarity measure [94], the similarity between
the profile vector and the predefined concept vectors is calculated. There are more than
1565 predefined concepts’ hierarchies and their sample documents.
A criminal information mining framework, proposed in [25], was designed by in-
tegrating state-of-the-art data mining techniques such as link analysis, association rule
mining, and social network analysis. The developed framework is believed to have the
capability of identifying different kinds of crimes. The main focus of the framework is to
collect network level information (i.e., web addresses). The framework can analyze only
structured documents such as police narratives. Xiang et al. [112] focused on visualizing
crime data for facilitating the work of an investigator.
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In order to automatically analyze large archives of online documents, an investi-
gator requires an integrated software tool. In the current study we employ most of the
aforesaid text mining techniques to design and implement a framework in order to help
an investigator perform a multi-stage analysis of electronic discourse including chat logs.
The framework takes suspicious chat logs as input, extracts named entities, divides them
into different groups, and then retrieves chat logs of each group for further processing.
We extract keywords and summary from each chat collection, which are then processed
to extract concepts and key concepts representing the topic of the chat log in question. The
extracted suspicious groups and their relationships are visualized in more intuitive fash-
ion. The state-of-the-art techniques employed to accomplish the abovementioned tasks
are discussed below.
We employ the widely used Stanford Named Entity Recognizer, called CRFClassi-
fier 1 to extract the named entities. The tool is tested on popular corpora such as MUC-
6, MUC-7, and ACE. To identify the relationships between the entities for determining
cliques, we apply frequent patterns mining techniques. Next, we use two criteria to ex-
tract the keywords: first, the word matches with the street term(s) listed in the domain-
specific cybercrimes taxonomy; second, the frequency of the word is above the user-
defined threshold. The sentences in which one or more keywords appear constitute the
summary.
The extracted keywords are converted into concepts and the concepts are converted
into key concepts and topics by using WordNet. The WordNet is a lexical database, de-
scribed in Chapter 8. The selection of WordNet for the purpose of concept mining and
1http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF-NER.shtml
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topic mining is based on: (1) words are organized into hierarchies of concepts called
synset (synonyms sets); (2) the hierarchies are based on both similarity and relatedness;
(3) Hyponymy, which means that the WordNet synsets are structured in such a way that
abstract concepts (called hypernyms) are given at a higher level while more specific con-
cepts (called hyponyms) are given at a lower level; and (4) a computer-readable database
of commonly used words.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented state-of-the-art techniques developed in the areas of
authorship analysis, stylometric features, and criminal information mining. In the author-
ship domain, we focus on the common classifiers used in different authorship analysis
studies. Stylometric features used in most authorship studies fall into five main categories
including lexical, syntactic, structural, content-specific, and idiosyncratic. The literature
of criminal information mining broadly covers the research areas of natural language pro-




In this chapter we provide a brief description of the methods we employ for collect-
ing initial information about a given suspicious dataset. The header content is usually
the immediate source for collecting preliminary information about a given collection of
suspicious online messages. The statistical analysis of an e-mail corpus–identifying all
the senders, the recipients associated with each sender, and the frequency of messages
exchanged between users–helps an investigator understand the overall picture. The struc-
ture of a person’s social network, extracted from a dataset, manifests information about
his/her behavior with other people, including her friends, colleagues, and family mem-
bers. In some investigations it is important to identify the physical location of the users.
This can be achieved by applying geographical localization and map retrieval techniques
on the e-mail addresses. Moreover, classifying messages into predefined topics can be
achieved by applying traditional text categorization techniques.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 calculates simple
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statistics on a given message collection. Section 3.2 summarizes the importance of social
networking techniques for learning about the general behavior of the users. Section 3.3
describes map retrieval techniques used for mapping an e-mail address to its physical loca-
tion. Section 3.4 describes the application of text classification and clustering techniques
to message analysis. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.1 Statistical Analysis
A statistical analysis of a message dataset analyzing the flow of messages between users
is important during the early stages of investigation. For instance, identifying the total
number of users (i.e., senders/recipients) and the distribution of messages per sender-
domain and per recipient-domain gives an overview of the entire message collection, as
shown in Figure 3.1. Similarly, the mailing frequency during different parts of the day
and night and the average response time of users are calculated to model their behavior.
For instance, an e-mail user may send more messages to her co-workers during the day
rather than night. Similarly, calculating the average size of a message and its attachment
(if one exists) and identifying the format of the message attachment are helpful in creating
a user’s profile. The user profile is used in anomaly detection systems for identifying the
abnormal behavior of users.
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Figure 3.1: Statistics calculated for an e-mail dataset
3.2 Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis is the study of analyzing communication links between people.
The social network for an e-mail dataset can be depicted as a graph, where the nodes
represent the senders and recipients, and the edges represent the flow of e-mail messages
between them. The structure of a user’s social network, extracted from his/her e-mails
manifests a great deal of information about his/her behavior within the community of
friends, colleagues, and family members. This information can be used to answer the fol-
lowing questions [17]: for example, (1) How often does a person maintain a relationship
with a group of people, and for how long? (2) Do these people have regular interactions
and can these interactions be distinguished based on roles such as work, friendship, and
family? (3) What type of views are a particular group of people exchanging? For instance,
44
the analysis of a criminal network can be used to discover interesting information about
potential suspects and periods of their suspicious activities. In this chapter, we do not
analyze the message body but rather focus on the message header.
Figure 3.2: User model
Our framework provides interesting information rendering and exploration capa-
bilities for visualizing social networks. Social networks are labeled with some simple
statistics computed about the flow of messages. We use two types of graphs to depict the
social network of message users. In the first graph, called user model, the nodes denote
e-mail users and the edges denote e-mail traffic, as shown in Figure 3.2. Statistical infor-
mation computed on a social network is rendered graphically using features of nodes and
links: size, shape, color, thickness, etc. For instance, the thickness of the links between
the nodes denotes the frequency of the messages sent and the arrow denotes the direction
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of message flow from sender to recipient. Similarly, the size of a node reflects a user’s
frequency of messages, called degree of centrality [38, 99]. An important user, e.g., the
“boss,” of a group of users is represented by a bigger node. Nodes associated with users
can be replaced with their photos to provide a more intuitive and elegant representation.
In the second graph, called temporal model, the user network is augmented with
time information about e-mails, plotted to show the temporal characteristics of message
flow, as shown in Figure 3.3. From this network, it is easy to identify causality effects
between e-mails, for instance, the scenario in which an e-mail is received by a user, who
in turn sends another e-mail at a later time. If, for example, both e-mails are classified to
the same topic category, e.g., drugs, then by following the chain of the e-mails one can
identify the potential collaborators.
Figure 3.3: Temporal model
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3.3 Geographic Localization
To understand the geographical scope of a cybercrime investigation, it is important to
localize the source and destination of the given suspicious messages. This information
will help an investigator in collecting additional clues about the potential suspects and
their physical locations. For this, we add a geographic visualization capability in our
framework, called map viewer, as shown in Figure 3.4. This capability can also be used
to localize information related to potential suspects, e-mail servers, and e-mail flow.
The proposed map viewer employs the commonly used geographical localization
techniques. It is a two-step process. First, the domain name of an e-mail server, ex-
tracted from an e-mail address, is translated into the corresponding IP address by using
the domain name server. Second, the geographical coordinates of the e-mail server are
identified by employing geographical localization techniques, provided at http://www.
geobytes.com/. In situations where the localization fails the server is mapped to a
default geographic location in the Atlantic Ocean having coordinates: latitude=0 and lon-
gitude=0. Once the physical location of each e-mail account is identified, the next step is
to display them on the global map. For this, we draw an arrow from sender to recipient as
shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Map viewer
3.4 Text Mining
Traditional keyword searching for identifying malicious documents is inefficient and error
prone due to a criminal community’s use of sophisticated obfuscation techniques. There-
fore, text mining, including classification and clustering, has gained great importance in
the context of computer forensics. Classification or supervised learning is used to iden-
tify the class label of an unknown document based on some previously defined classes.
Classification techniques have been very successful in resolving authorial disputes over
poetic and historic collections. In cybercrime investigation classification techniques are
used for authorship analysis of anonymous messages for identifying perpetrators involved
in illegitimate activities. Clustering is an unsupervised learning process used to retrieve
hidden patterns and structures [6] from a dataset without having any previous knowledge.
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Unlike classification, where an unknown object is assigned to one of the predefined class,
clustering is applied to identify the pertinent groups of objects based on some similarity
measure. Clustering is employed for information retrieval [69] and authorship similar-
ity detection [122]. Clustering can be applied to textual content as well as stylometric
features.
In addition to header-content analysis, we also use traditional text categorization
techniques [43] for message classification. In general, text classification starts by prepro-
cessing, followed by classifier training and testing. The validated model is then employed
to identify the class label of the unknown document. The class label is the topic name
from a list of predefined topic categories.
Preprocessing is an essential step in most text mining processes. Preprocessing
starts by message extraction, followed by cleaning, tokenization, stemming, and stopword
removal. Often the available data is noisy, containing unwanted and irrelevant informa-
tion. Similarly, the data need to be converted into the format acceptable by the data mining
process in question. After extracting the body of an online message (e.g., an e-mail or a
chat session), text written in a language other than English or French (in some cases) is
discarded. E-mail attachments, chain of replied messages, and (in some cases) HTML
tags are also deleted from the e-mails.
We use Java tokenizer API to convert each message µ into a set of tokens or words.
The different forms of the same word appearing in a message are converted into the root
word by applying stemming algorithms, e.g., Porter stemmer [81, 86]. For instance, the
words write, wrote, written, and writing are converted into the word (say) write. The list
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of tokens are then scanned for the all-purpose stopwords, containing function words (e.g.,
‘is’, ‘my’, ‘yours’, and ‘below’), short words (e.g., words containing 1-3 characters),
punctuation, special characters, and space characters. These words usually do not con-
tribute to the subject matter of a message and are deleted. The actual number of function
words varies; [121] lists 150 while [4] mentions 303 function words.
The content-specific terms are used for features extraction. A feature is usually the
relative weight calculated for each term. It can be simply the frequency of a term t j within
a message µi denoted by t f(i; j); or it can be computed by employing certain functions such
as t f   id f , described in [61], and is given as
(t f   id f )(i; j) = t f(i; j)  id f(i; j)
where t f   id f(i; j) is the weight of a term t j within a message µi, t f(i; j) is the frequency of
a term t j within message µi, id f(i; j) = log(
N
d fi
) is the inverse document frequency, N is the
total number of messages, and d fi is the number of messages where the term ti appears.
Each message µ is represented as a ‘bag of words’ using vector space representa-
tion [93]. Once all the messages are converted into vectors, normalization is applied to
scale down the term frequencies to [0,1] to avoid overweighing one feature over another.
The selected column is scanned for the maximum number and is used to divide all other
members of that column.
To develop a classification model we divide the given message collection into two
sets: a training set (comprising 23 of total messages) and testing set comprising (
1
3 of
total messages). Each message instance of the given sample data carries a class label,
representing its topic category. Common classifiers include decision tree [87], neural
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networks [70], and Support Vector Machine [61]. The validated model is then employed
for classification of a message for which the topic category is not known. Usually, the
larger the training set, the better the accuracy of the model. For this purpose, we use
WEKA, a data mining software toolkit [111]. Therefore, the feature vectors are con-
verted into WEKA compatible format, Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF), described
in Section 2.2.
Sometimes an investigator is asked to analyze a given collection of anonymous doc-
uments without any prior knowledge. To initiate the process of investigation the investiga-
tor would like to identify the major topics contained in the given documents. Traditional
content-based clustering can be used to first divide the messages into pertinent groups,
and then tag each cluster with the most frequent words, as discussed in Section 2.4. In
our framework we use three clustering algorithms: Expectation Maximization (EM), k-
means, and bisecting k-means.
Once the clusters are obtained, each cluster is tagged with the high frequency words
found in the respective cluster. The clusters can be used for document retrieval by match-
ing the given keywords with the cluster labels. The matched clusters are retrieved in the
order of relevance to the search criterion (query content).
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the header-level functionalities of our framework. For
instance, we have applied statistical analysis to get an overview of the given message
collection. Social network analysis techniques have been used to learn about the flow of
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messages between the message users. Geographical techniques have been employed to
localize the users on the global map. The predictive machine learning algorithms (classi-
fication and clustering) have been applied for message classification and categorization.
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Chapter 4
Writeprint Mining for Authorship
Attribution
In this chapter, we develop a novel approach of frequent pattern-based writeprint creation
to address two authorship problems, i.e., authorship attribution in the usual way, and au-
thorship attribution by focusing on stylistic variations. Stylistic variation is the occasional
change in the writing features of an individual with respect to the type of recipient s/he
is writing to and the topic of a message. The authorship methods proposed in this chap-
ter and in the following chapters are applicable to different types of online messages.
However, for the purpose of experimentation, we use an e-mail corpus in this chapter.
The problem of authorship attribution in the context of online messages can be
described as follows: a cyber forensic investigator wants to determine the author of a
given malicious e-mailw and has to prove that the author is likely to be one of the suspects
fS1;    ;Sng. The problem is to identify the most plausible author from the suspects
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fS1;    ;Sng and to gather convincing evidence to support the finding in a court of law.
The problem of authorship identification in the context of e-mail forensics is dis-
tinct from traditional authorship problems in two ways. First, the number of potential
suspects is larger and their (usually confiscated) previously written documents (e.g., e-
mails), available to the investigator, are greater in number. Second, by assumption, the
true author should certainly be one of the suspects.
The problem of authorship analysis becomes more challenging by taking into con-
sideration the occasional variation in the writing style of the same person. The authorship
attribution studies [34, 121] discuss contextual and temporal variation in people’s writ-
ing styles, but none of these studies propose methods for capturing the stylistic variation.
The writing style of a suspect may change either due to change in the context (or topic
of discussion in e-mail) or the type of recipient [34]. Employing analytical techniques
over the entire collection of an author’s writing samples without considering the issue of
stylistic variation (the term coined for the first time in the current study) would produce
misleading results.
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach of extracting a frequent pattern-based
“writeprint” to address the attribution problem in the usual way, as depicted in Figure 4.1.
Then, we extend the proposed approach to address the same problem of authorship attri-
bution with stylistic variation or stylistic inconsistency, as shown in Figure 4.2.
The use of fingerprinting techniques for identifying a potential suspect in a tra-
ditional criminal investigation process is not applicable to the digital world. However,
authorship studies [20, 116] suggest that people usually leave traces of their personality
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in their written work. Therefore, in cyber forensics, an investigator would like to identify
the “writeprint” of an individual from his/her e-mail messages and use it for authorship
attribution. The key question is:
What exactly are the patterns that can represent the writeprint of an individual?
Our insight is that the writeprint of an individual is the combinations of features that occur
frequently in his/her written e-mail messages. The commonly used features are lexical,
syntactical, structural, and content-specific attributes (see Section 2.3.1). By matching the
writeprint with the malicious e-mail, the true author can be identified. Most importantly,
the matched writeprint should provide credible evidence for supporting the conclusion.
The research community [33, 104, 121] has devoted a lot of effort studying stylistic and
structural features individually, but few have studied the combinations of features that
form a writeprint and addressed the issue of evidence gathering.
Figure 4.1 depicts an overview of our proposed method, called AuthorMiner1, for
addressing the usual attribution problem. We first extract the set of frequent patterns
independently from the e-mail messages Mi written by suspect Si. Though the set of
frequent patterns captures the writing style of a suspect Si, it is inappropriate to use all
the frequent patterns to form the writeprint of a suspect Si because another suspect, say
S j, may share some common writing patterns with Si. Therefore, it is crucial to filter out
the common frequent patterns and identify the unique patterns that can differentiate the
writing style of a suspect from that of others. These unique patterns form the writeprint
of a suspect.


















































Figure 4.1: AuthorMiner1: Authorship identification without stylistic variation
version of the AuthorMiner1, called AuthorMiner2. An overview of AuthorMiner2 is
shown in Figure 4.2 and is outlined in algorithm 4.2. First, each message collectionMi of
a suspect Si is divided into different groups fG1i ;    ;Gki g. Second, frequent stylometric
patterns FP(Ggi ) from each groupG
g
i are extracted. Third, the frequent patterns shared be-
tween two or more groups across all the suspects are deleted. The remaining frequent sty-
lometric patterns form the sub-writeprint of each group Ggi , denoted byWP(G
g
i ). Fourth,
we identify the most plausible author Sa of w by comparing every extracted writeprint

































































































Figure 4.2: AuthorMiner2: Authorship identification with stylistic variation
This approach has the following merits that are not found in most of the existing
works.
• Justifiable evidence: The write-print, represented as a set of unique patterns, is ex-
tracted from the sample documents of a particular suspect. Our method guarantees
that the identified patterns are frequent in the documents of one suspect only and
not frequent in others’ documents. It will be difficult for an accused suspect to
deny the validity of the findings. The results obtained are traceable, justifiable, and
can be presented quantitatively with a statistical support. The traditional authorship
identification methods, such as SVM and neural networks [104, 121], do not have
the same merit.
• Flexible writing styles: The frequent pattern-mining technique can adopt all four
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types of commonly used writing style features (described in Section 2.3.1). This
flexibility is important for determining the combined effect of different features.
This is much more flexible than the traditional decision tree, which primarily relies
on the nodes at the top of the tree to differentiate the writing styles of all suspects.
• Features optimization: Unlike traditional approaches, where it is hard to determine
the contribution of each feature in the authorship attribution process [34], the pro-
posed technique is based on the distinctive patterns, the combination of features.
The support associated to each pattern in the write-print set determines the contri-
bution of each pattern.
• Capturing inconsistent stylistics: Our analysis shows that the writing style of a per-
son is not usually consistent and may change depending on the recipients and the
context of the message. Our proposed algorithm is able to capture the sub-stylistic
attributes of an individual by employing the idea of frequent patterns. Our exper-
imental results suggest that the identification of sub-writeprints can improve the
accuracy of authorship identification. Most importantly, the sub-writeprint reveals
the fine-grained writing styles of an individual that can be valuable information for
an investigator.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 formally defines the two
subproblems of authorship attribution. Section 4.2 describes the building blocks of the
two proposed approaches. Section 4.3 describes our proposed approaches for addressing
the two subproblems. Section 4.4 evaluates the proposed twomethods on a real-life e-mail
dataset. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.1 Problem Statement
The problem of authorship attribution is divided into two subproblems. The first subprob-
lem is the traditional authorship attribution problem in which we ignore the occasional
change in the writing style of a person and try to extract the stylometric features from
the entire message collection of a suspect. In the second subproblem, we take the style
inconsistency or stylistic variation of a suspect into consideration and propose methods
for dividing the messages of each suspect into different groups to capture the stylistic
variation prior to apply the authorship identification process.
4.1.1 Attribution without Stylistic Variation
The problem of authorship attribution is to identify the true author of an anonymous
message w. The true author is assumed to be among the potential suspects fS1;    ;Sng.
The investigator assumes to have access to the training samples of the suspects. In real-life
investigation, the sample text messages can be obtained from the suspects’ e-mail archives
and chat logs on the seized personal computer, or from the e-mail service provider with
warrants. The findings need to be supported with convincing arguments.
Definition 4.1.1 (Authorship attribution). Let fS1;    ;Sng be the set of suspected authors
of a malicious e-mail message w. We assume to have access to sample messages Mi, for
each suspect Si 2 fS1;    ;Sng. The problem of authorship attribution is to identify the
most plausible author Sa, from the suspects fS1;    ;Sng, whose collection of messages
Ma has the “best match” with the patterns in the malicious message w. Intuitively, a
collection of messages Mi matches w if Mi and w share similar patterns of stylometric
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features such as vocabulary usage.
The problem of authorship attribution can be refined into three subproblems: (1) To
identify the writeprintWP(Mi) from each set of e-mail messagesMi 2 fM1;    ;Mmg. (2)
To determine the author of the malicious e-mail w by matching w with each of fWP(M1);
   ;WP(Mm)g. (3) To extract evidence for supporting the conclusion on authorship. The
evidence has to be intuitive enough for convincing the judge and the jury in the court
of law. These three subproblems summarize the challenges in typical investigation pro-
cedure. To solve subproblems (1) and (2), we first extract the set of frequent patterns
FP(Mi) fromMi and then filter out the patterns appearing in any other sets of e-mailsM j.
For subproblem (3), the writeprint WP(Ma) could serve the evidence for supporting the
conclusion, whereMa is the set of e-mail messages written by the identified author Sa.
4.1.2 Attribution with Stylistic Variation
The existing authorship studies though mention about the changing style of an author ei-
ther conscientiously or unconscientiously in his writing, however, they ignore it. In the
current study, we define the problem of authorship attribution with focus on the problem
of stylistic variation or volitive stylistics. The problem is to first isolate the different sub-
styles of a suspect, capture those styles and then compute the writeprint for each sub-style
called sub-writeprint of the suspect. Next, the anonymous message is compared with each
sub-writeprint to identify its true author. More explicit description of the problem defini-
tion is given as follows.
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Definition 4.1.2 (Authorship identification with stylistic variation). Suppose
fS1;    ;Sng be a set of suspected authors of an anonymous text messagew. Let fM1;    ;Mng
be the sets of text messages previously written by suspects fS1;    ;Sng, respectively. As-
sume the message samples reflect the phenomenon of stylistic variation, which means the
collected messages contain different topics and are written to different types of recipients,
e.g., co-workers and friends. Further, assuming the number of messages of each set Mi,
denoted by jMij, is reasonably large (say >30). The problem is to first divide messages
Mi of each suspect Si 2 fS1;    ;Sng into k different groups fG1i ;    ;Gki g and then apply
the attribution problem to identify the most plausible suspect Sa 2 fS1;    ;Sng. The sus-
pected author Sa is the one whose (at least one) sub-writeprint has the “best match” with
the features in w.
4.2 Building Blocks of the Proposed Approach
The core concepts or the building blocks of our proposed approach are: features extraction
and feature discretization. The extracted features are used to identify frequent stylometric




The feature extraction starts by message extraction followed by cleaning, tokenization,
and stemming, as discussed in Section 3.4. There are more than a thousand stylometric
features used so far in different studies [4, 121]. As listed in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, we
carefully select 285 features in our study. In general, there are three types of features. The
first type is a numerical value, e.g., the frequencies of some individual characters, punc-
tuations, and special characters. To avoid the situation where very large values overweigh
other features, we apply normalization to scale down all the numerical values to [0;1].
The second type is a boolean value, e.g., to check whether or not an e-mail contains
a reply message. The third type of features is computed by taking as input some other
lexical functions such as vocabulary richness, indexed at 93-98 in Table 4.1. Most of these
features are computed in terms of vocabulary size V (N) and text length N [106]. When
feature extraction is done, each e-mail is represented as a vector of feature values. In this
thesis we focus on using structural features as they play a significant role in distinguishing
writing styles.
Short words comprising of 1-3 characters (such as ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘or’, ‘and’, etc.) are
mostly context-independent and are counted together. Frequencies of words of various
lengths 1-30 characters, indexed at 58-87 in Table 4.1, are counted separately. Hepax
Legomena and Hapax dislegomena are the terms used for once-occurring and twice-
occurring words. As mentioned earlier, we have used more than 150 function words,
listed in Appendix I.
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We also check whether an e-mail has welcoming and/or farewell greetings. Para-
graph separator can be a blank line or just a tab/indentation or there may be no separator
between paragraphs.
Table 4.1: Lexical and syntactic features
Feature Type Feature Name
Lexical 1. Character count including space characters (M)
2. Ratio of digits to M
3. Ratio of letters to M
4. Ratio of uppercase letters to M
5. Ratio of spaces to M
6. Ratio of tabs to M
7-32. Alphabet frequency (A-Z) (26 features)
33-53. Occurrences of special characters: < > % | { } [ ]
/ \ @ # ~ + - * $ ^ & _ $ \div$ (21 features)
54. Word count (W)
55. Average word length
56. Average sentence-length in terms of characters
57. Ratio of short words (1-3 characters) to W
58-87. Ratio of word length frequency distribution to W (30 features)
88. Ratio of function words to W
89. Vocabulary richness, i.e., T/W
90. Ratio of Hapax legomena to W
91. Ratio of Hapax legomena to T







Syntactic 99-106. Occurrences of punctuations , . ? ! : ; ’ " (8 features)
107. Ratio of punctuations with M
108-257. Occurrences of function words (150 features)
Thirteen content-specific terms (273-285) are selected from the Enron e-mail cor-
pus 1 by applying content-based clustering. Each message is represented as a feature
1http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/
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vector using vector space model, as shown in Table 4.3. This table represents 10 sample
messages, where each row represents one e-mail message.
Table 4.2: Structural and domain-specific features
Feature Type Feature Name
Structural 258. Ratio of blank lines/total number of lines within e-mail
259. Sentence count
260. Paragraph count
261. Presence/absence of greetings
262. Has tab as separators between paragraphs
263. Has blank line between paragraphs
264. Presence/absence of separator between paragraphs
265. Average paragraph length in terms of characters
266. Average paragraph length in terms of words
267. Average paragraph length in terms of sentences
268. Contains Replied message
269. Position of replied message in the e-mail
270. Use e-mail as a signature
271. Use telephone as signature
272. Use URL as a signature
Domain-specific 273-285. deal, HP, sale, payment, check, windows, software,
offer, Microsoft, meeting, conference, room, report (13 features)
One may first apply feature selection [75] as a preprocessing step to determine a
subset of stylometric features that can discriminate the authors. There are two general
approaches [98]: Forward selection starts with no features and, at each step, adds the fea-
ture that decreases the error the most until any further addition does not decrease the error
significantly. Backward selection starts with all the features and, at each step, remove the
one that decreases the error the most until any further removal increases the error signifi-
cantly. These approaches consider only one attribute at a time. In contrast, our proposed
approach employs the notion of frequent stylometric patterns that capture the combined
effect of features. Irrelevant features will not be frequent in our approach. Thus, there is
64
no need to apply feature selection. More importantly, feature selection does not guarantee
the property of uniqueness among the writeprints of the suspects.
Table 4.3: Stylometric feature vectors (prior to discretization)
Messages (µ) Feature X Feature Y Feature Z
µ1 0.130 0.580 0.555
µ2 0.132 0.010 0.001
µ3 0.133 0.0124 0.123
µ4 0.119 0.250 0.345
µ5 0 0.236 0.532
µ6 0.150 0.570 0.679
µ7 0 0.022 0.673
µ8 0.865 0.883 0.990
µ9 0.137 0.444 0.494
µ10 0.0 0.455 1.000
4.2.2 Feature Discretization
The feature vectors, extracted in the previous step, contain numeric values. To extract
frequent patterns from the message dataset, we apply Apriori algorithm [7]. For this, we
need to transform the numeric feature values into boolean type indicating the presence or
absence of a feature within a message. We discretize each feature Fa 2 fF1;    ;Fgg into a
set of intervals fi1;    ; ihg, called feature items. Common discretization techniques are:
• Equal-width discretization, where the size of each interval is the same.
• Equal-frequency discretization, where each interval has approximately the same
number of records assigned to it.
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• Clustering-based discretization, where clustering is performed on the distance of
neighboring points.
Due to the small size of an e-mail message, most feature values fall into the be-
ginning of an interval and need to be discretized in a more dynamic way. Our initial ex-
perimental results indicate that the value of most features are close to zero with very few
features having larger values. Therefore, employing equal-width discretization, and/or
equal-frequency discretization is not a good choice while the clustering-based discretiza-
tion method is complex and computationally expensive. To fit the niche, we have devel-
oped a new discretization mechanism called controlled binary split which has substan-
tially improved the results as compared to our initial study [60].
In the proposed technique, we successively split the feature value into two intervals
and check if the number of feature occurrences is less than the user specified threshold
or not. The binary splitting continues until all the feature values are discretized. The
normalized feature frequency, found in a message, is then matched with these intervals.
A boolean ‘1’ is assigned to the feature item if the interval contains the normalized feature
frequency; otherwise a ‘0’ is assigned.
Example 4.2.1. Consider Table 4.4, which contains 10 e-mail messages. Let us assume
that fX ;Y;Zg represent the set of features extracted from these messages. Next, each
feature is converted into feature items by applying discretization. For example, fea-
ture X having normalized values in the range [0;1] and suppose the user threshold is
5%, i.e., the splitting continues until each interval contains at most 5% of the total num-
ber of feature occurrences. Feature X is discretized into three intervals X1 = [0;0:120],
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Table 4.4: Stylometric feature vectors (after discretization)
Feature X Feature Y Feature Z
Messages (µ) X1 X2 X3 Y1 Y2 Z1 Z2
µ1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
µ2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
µ3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
µ4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
µ5 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
µ6 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
µ7 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
µ8 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
µ9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
µ10 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
X2 = (0:120;0:140], and X3 = (0:140;1:000], representing three feature items. Similarly,
features Y and Z are discretized into Y1 = [0;0:500], Y2 = (0:500;1], Z1 = [0;0:500], and
Z2 = (0:500;1], respectively. The message µ1 containing features X = 0:130, Y = 0:250,
and Z = 0:020 can be represented as a feature vector hX2;Y2;Z2i.
4.2.3 Frequent Stylometric Patterns
Intuitively, the stylometric patterns or the writing style patterns in an ensemble of e-mail
messages Mi (written by suspect Si) is a combination of feature items that frequently
occurs in Mi. We concisely model and capture such frequent patterns by the concept of
frequent itemset [7] described as follows.
LetU = fi1;    ; iug denote the universe of all stylometric feature items. Let Mi be
a set of e-mail messages where each message µ 2Mi is represented as a set of stylometric
feature items such that µ U . A text message µ contains a stylometric feature item i j if
the numerical feature value of the message µ falls within the interval of i j. The writing
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style features of some sample messages are represented as vectors of feature items in
Table 4.5.
Let P  U be a set of stylometric feature items called a stylometric pattern. A
text message µ contains a stylometric pattern P if P  µ. A stylometric pattern that con-
tains k stylometric feature items is a k-pattern. For example, the stylometric pattern
P= fi1; i4; i6g is a 3-pattern. The support of a stylometric pattern P is the percentage of
text messages in Mi that contains P. A stylometric pattern P is frequent in a set of mes-
sages Mi if the support of P is greater than or equal to a user-specified minimum support
threshold.
Definition 4.2.1 (Frequent stylometric pattern). Let Mi be the set of text messages writ-
ten by suspect Si. Let support(PjMi) be the percentage of text messages in Mi that con-
tain the pattern P, where P  U . A pattern P is a frequent stylometric pattern in Mi
if support(PjMi)  min_sup, where the minimum support threshold min_sup is a real
number in an interval of [0;1].
The writing style of a suspect Si is represented as a set of frequent stylometric
patterns, denoted by FP(Mi) = fP1;    ;Plg, extracted from his/her set of text messages
Mi.
Example 4.2.2. Consider the messages, represented as vectors of feature items, in Ta-
ble 4.5. Suppose the user-specified threshold min_sup = 0:3, which means that a stylo-
metric pattern P = fi1;    ; ieg is frequent if at least 3 out of the 10 e-mails contain all
feature items in P. For instance, fX1g is not a frequent stylometric pattern because it has
support 2/10=0.2. The feature item fX2g is a frequent stylometric 1-pattern because it has
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support 0.4. Similarly, fX2;Y1g is a frequent stylometric 2-pattern because it has support
0.4. Likewise, fX2;Y1;Z1g is a frequent stylometric 3-pattern because it has support 0.3.
Example 8.2.1 shows how to efficiently compute all frequent patterns.
Table 4.5: Message representation in terms of feature items












In forensic science, an individual can be uniquely identified by his/her fingerprint. In
cyber forensics, can we identify the “writeprint” of an individual from his/her e-mails?
We do not claim that the identified writeprint in this study can uniquely distinguish every
individual in the world, but the identified writeprint is accurate enough to uniquely iden-
tify the writing pattern of an individual among the suspects fS1;    ;Sng because common
patterns among the suspects are filtered out and will not become part of the writeprint.
The notion of frequent pattern in Definition 8.1.1 captures the writing patterns of
a suspect. However, two suspects Si and S j may share some similar writing patterns.
Therefore, it is important to filter out the common frequent patterns and retain the frequent
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patterns that are unique to each suspect. This leads us to the notion of writeprint.
Intuitively, a writeprint can uniquely represent the writing style of a suspect Si if its
patterns are found only in the e-mails written by Si, but not in any other suspect’s e-mails.
In other words, the writeprint of a suspect Si is a collection of frequent patterns that are
frequent in the e-mail messages Mi written by Si but not frequent in the messages M j
written by any other suspect S j where i 6= j.
Definition 4.2.2 (writeprint). A writeprint, denoted byWP(Mi), is a set of patterns where
each pattern P has support(PjMi) min_sup and support(PjM j) < min_sup for anyM j
where i 6= j, min_sup is a user-specified minimum threshold. In other words,WP(Mi)
FP(Mi), andWP(Mi)\WP(M j) = /0 for any 1 i; j  n and i 6= j.
4.3 Proposed Approaches
The proposed solution is divided into two parts. The first part, called AuthorMiner1, ad-
dresses the traditional attribution problem without the consideration of stylistic variation
while the second part, called AuthorMiner2, addresses the attribution problem with the
consideration of stylistic variation. Detailed description of the two components is given
in the following two subsections.
4.3.1 AuthorMiner1: Attribution without Stylistic Variation
Algorithm 4.1 presents a novel data mining method, called AuthorMiner1, for determin-
ing the authorship of a malicious e-mail message w from a group of suspects fS1;    ;Sng
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based on the extracted features of their previously written e-mail messages fM1;    ;Mng.
In this section, an e-mail message is represented by a set of feature items. We summarize
the algorithm in the following three phases followed by a detailed description of each
phase.
Require: An anonymous message w.
Require: Sets of messages fM1;    ;Mng, written by fS1;    ;Sng.
/* Mining frequent stylometric patterns */
1: for each Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng do
2: extract frequent stylometric patterns FP(Mi) fromMi;
3: end for
/* Filtering out common frequent patterns */
4: for each FP(Mi) 2 fFP(M1);    ;FP(Mn)g do
5: for each FP(M j) 2 fFP(Mi+1);    ;FP(Mn)g do
6: for each frequent pattern Px 2 FP(Mi) do
7: for each frequent pattern Py 2 FP(M j) do
8: if Px = Py then
9: FP(Mi) FP(Mi) Px;





15: WP(Mi) Dis joint f requent patterns(Mi);
16: end for
/* Identifying author */
17: highest_score  1;
18: for allWP(Mi) 2 fWP(M1);    ;WP(Mn)g do








Phase 1: Mining frequent patterns (Lines 1-3). Extract the frequent patterns FP(Mi)
from each collection of e-mail messagesMi written by suspect Si. The extracted frequent
patterns capture the writing style of a suspect.
Phase 2: Filtering common frequent patterns (Lines 4-16). Though FP(Mi) may
capture the writing patterns of suspect Si, FP(Mi) may contain frequent patterns that are
shared by other suspects. Therefore, Phase 2 removes the common frequent patterns.
Specifically, a pattern P in FP(Mi) is removed if any other FP(M j) also contains P,
where i 6= j. The remaining frequent patterns in FP(Mi) form the writeprint WP(Mi)
of suspect Si. When this phase completes, we have a set of writeprints fWP(M1);    ;
WP(Mn)g of suspects fS1;    ;Sng. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the writeprint WP(M2)
comes from FP(M2) by filtering out the frequent patterns shared by FP(M1), FP(M2),
and/or FP(M3).
Phase 3: Identifying author (Lines 17-24). Compare the malicious e-mail message
w with each writeprint WP(Mi) 2 fWP(M1);    ;WP(Mn)g and identify the most simi-
lar writeprint that matches w. Intuitively, a writeprint WP(Mi) is similar to the e-mail
message w if many frequent patterns in WP(Mi) can be found in w. Our insight is that
the frequent patterns are not equally important. Their importance is reflected by their
supprt(PjMi); therefore, we derive a score function Score(wWP(Mi)) to measure the
weighted similarity between the e-mail message w and the frequent patterns inWP(Mi).
The suspect Sa of writeprint WP(Ma), which has the highest Score(w WP(Mi)), is
classified to be the author of the malicious e-mail message w.
72
Mining Frequent Stylometric Patterns (Lines 1-3): Lines 1-3 mine the frequent pat-
terns FP(Mi) from each collection of e-mail message Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng, for 1  i  n.
There are many data mining algorithms for extracting frequent patterns, for example,
Apriori [7], FP-growth [51], and ECLAT [118]. Below, we provide an overview of the
Apriori algorithm which has been previously applied to various text mining tasks [46,57].
Apriori is a level-wise iterative search algorithm that uses frequent k-patterns to
explore the frequent (k+ 1)-patterns. First, the set of frequent 1-patterns is found by
scanning the e-mail messages Mi, accumulating the support count of each feature item,
and collecting the feature item i that has support(ijMi)min_sup. The resulting frequent
1-patterns are then used to find frequent 2-patterns, which are then used to find frequent
3-patterns, and so on, until no more frequent k-patterns can be found. The generation
of frequent (k+ 1)-patterns from frequent k-patterns is based on the following Apriori
property.
Property 4.3.1 (Apriori property). All nonempty subsets of a frequent pattern must also
be frequent.
By definition, a pattern P is not frequent if support (PjMi)< min_sup. The above
property implies that adding a feature item i to a non-frequent pattern P will never make
it more frequent. Thus, if a k-pattern P is not frequent, then there is no need to generate
(k+ 1)-pattern P[ i because P[ i is also not frequent. The following example shows
how the Apriori algorithm exploits this property to efficiently extract all frequent patterns.
Refer to [7] for a formal description.
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Example 4.3.1. Consider Table 4.5 with min_sup = 0:3. First, identify all frequent 1-
patterns by scanning the database once to obtain the support of every feature item. The
feature items having support  0:3 are frequent 1-patterns, denoted by L1 = ffX2g, fY1g,
fZ1g, fZ2gg. Then, join L1 with itself, i.e., L1 1 L1, to generate the candidate list `2 =
ffX2;Y1g, fX2;Z1g, fX2;Z2g, fY1;Z1g, fY1;Z2g, fZ1;Z2gg and scan the database once to
obtain the support of every pattern in `2. Identify the frequent 2-patterns, denoted by L2
= ffX2;Y1g, fX2;Z1g, fY1;Z1g, fY1;Z2gg. Similarly, perform L2 1 L2 to generate `3 and
scan the database once to identify the frequent 3-patterns which is L3 = fX2;Y1;Z1g. The
finding of each set of frequent k-patterns requires one full scan of the feature items in
Table 4.5.
Filtering Common Patterns (Lines 4-16): This phase filters out the common frequent
patterns among fFP(M1);    ;FP(Mn)g. The general idea is to compare every frequent
pattern Px in FP(Mi) with every frequent pattern Py in all other FP(M j), and to remove
them from FP(Mi) and FP(M j) if Px and Py are the same. The computational complexity
of this step is O(jFP(M)jn), where jFP(M)j is the number of frequent patterns in FP(M)
and n is the number of suspects. The remaining frequent patterns in FP(Mi) form the
writeprintWP(Mi) of suspect Si.
Example 4.3.2. Suppose there are three suspects S1, S2, and S3 having three sets of e-mail
messages M1, M2, and M3 respectively, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Let FP(M1) = ffX1g,
fY1g, fZ2g, fX1;Y1g, fX1;Z2g, fY1;Z2g, fX1;Y1;Z2gg be the frequent patterns of S1. Let
FP(M2) = ffX2g, fY1g, fZ1g, fZ2g, fX2;Y1g, fX2;Z1g, fY1, Z1g, fY1, Z2g, fX2;Y1;Z1gg
be the set of frequent patterns of S2, as given in Example 8.2.1. Let FP(M3) = ffX1g,
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fY3g, fZ2g, fX1;Y3g, fX1;Z2g, fY3;Z2g, fX1;Y3, Z2gg be the set of frequent patterns of
S3. Then, we discard fX1g, fY1g, fZ2g, fX1;Z2g, fY1;Z2g as they are shared by two
or more suspects. The remaining frequent patterns form the writeprints of the suspects:
WP(M1)= ffX1;Y1g, fX1;Y1;Z2gg,WP(M2)= ffX2g, fZ1g, fX2;Y1g, fX2;Z1g, fY1;Z1g,
fX2;Y1;Z1gg, and WP(M3) = ffY3g, fX1;Y3g, fY3, Z2g, fX1;Y3;Z2gg.
Identifying Author (Lines 17-24): Lines 17-24 determine the author of malicious e-
mail messagew by comparingwwith each writeprintWP(Mi)2fWP(M1);    ;WP(Mn)g
and identifying the most similar writeprint to w. Intuitively, a writeprintWP(Mi) is simi-
lar to w if many frequent patterns inWP(Mi) matches the style in w. Formally, a frequent
pattern P matches w if w contains every feature item in P.
Equation 4.1 shows the score function that quantifies the similarity between the
malicious message w and a writeprint WP(Mi). The frequent patterns are not equally
important, and their importance is reflected by their support in Mi, i.e., the percentage
of e-mail messages in Mi sharing such combination of features. Thus, the score function
accumulates the support of a frequent pattern and divides the result by the number of




where MP= fMP1;    ;MPrg is a set of matched patterns betweenWP(Mi) and the ma-
licious e-mail message w. The score is a real number within the range [0;1]. The higher
the score means the higher the similarity between the writeprint and the malicious e-mail
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message w. The suspect having the writeprint with the highest score is the author of the
malicious e-mail w.
Example 4.3.3. Let the patterns found in the malicious e-mail message w be fX2;Y1;Z1g
and fX1;Y1;Z2g. Comparing them to the writeprints in Example 4.3.4, we notice that
the first pattern matches to a pattern in WP(M2) while the second pattern matches to a
pattern inWP(M1). The score calculated according to Equation 4.1 is higher forWP(M1)
because jWP(M1)j < jWP(M2)j. As a result, the message w is most similar toWP(M1),
suggesting that S1 is its author.
In the unlikely case that multiple suspects have the same highest score, AuthorMiner1
returns the suspect whose the number of matched patterns jMPj is the largest. In case mul-
tiple suspects have the same highest score and the same number of matched patterns, Au-
thorMiner1 returns the suspect whose the size of matched k-pattern is the largest because
having a match on large sized frequent stylometric k-pattern implies a strong match. To fa-
cilitate the evaluation procedure in our experiment, the method presented here is designed
to return only one suspect. In the actual deployment of the method, a more preferable
solution is to return a list of suspects ranked by their scores, followed by the number of
matched patterns and the size of the largest matched pattern.
4.3.2 AuthorMiner2: Attribution with Stylistic Variation
In the AuthorMiner2, we focus on the occasional change in the writing style of individuals
due to the change in the context and/or target recipient. The change may occur both in
the contents as well as in the style markers. For instance, e-mails that a person writes
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to his job colleagues are more formal than what he writes to his family members and
friends. Co-workers of a financial company may write more about meetings, promotion
schemes, customer problems and solutions, salaries, and bonuses. E-mails exchanged
among friends may contain discussion about trips, visits, funny stories, and jokes.
The writing style features like the selection and distribution of function words and
punctuation may be different in different contexts. Moreover, a person may be more
formal and careful in using structural features like the greeting and farewell comments
in e-mails written to his “boss”. One may prefer to put complete signatures including
his designation and contact information in his job communication. More importantly,
malicious e-mails are mostly anonymous and will devoid of such traceable information.
In fact, information (topic words and stylometric features) extracted from malicious
messages is overshadowed by regular messages as the malicious messages are usually
much fewer in number than the regular messages. The analytical techniques employed
over such intermingled writing samples would produce misleading results.
To address the authorship problem in Definition 4.1.2, we propose the algorithm,
called AuthorMiner2, to identify the author of an anonymous message w from the sus-
pects fS1;    ;Sng, based on the writeprints extracted from their previously written mes-
sages fM1;    ;Mng. AuthorMiner2 is employed to capture the different writing styles,
called sub-styles, of a person, the authorship identification accuracy can be improved. Our
experimental results support the hypothesis and suggest that the author identification ac-
curacy of AuthorMiner2 is higher than AuthorMiner1. Most importantly, AuthorMiner2
can be employed to concisely present the fine-grained writing styles of an individual.
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Figure 4.2 shows an overview of AuthorMiner2 in four steps. Step 1 groups the
e-mail messages Mi (of suspect Si) by the types of message recipients. The recipient
type is identified by using different parameters, e.g., e-mail address domains. Each set
of training sample messages Mi is divided into groups fG1i ;    ;Gki g. Step 2 extracts
the frequent stylometric patterns FP(Ggi ) from each group G
g
i 2 fG1i ;    ;Gki g. Step 3
filters out the common frequent stylometric patterns shared between any two of the groups
across all suspects. The remaining frequent stylometric patterns form the writeprint of
each group Ggi , denoted by WP(G
g
i ). Step 4 identifies the most plausible author Sa of
w by comparing each extracted writeprintWP(Ggi ) with w. Detailed description of each
step in Algorithm 4.2 is given below.
Grouping Messages: Step 1 (Lines 1-2 in Algorithm 4.2) divides messages Mi of each
suspect Si into different groups fG1i ;    ;Gki g. Grouping is done on the basis of e-mail
body as well as e-mail header information. Headers usually contain sender/recipient ad-
dress, time stamp, and path traveled by a message. To perform the first type of grouping,
we employ clustering techniques.
Grouping based on Message Body: We apply two types of clustering: content-based
and stylometry-based. In content-based clustering, the messages are divided into different
groups based on the topic of discussion [69]. Stylometry-based clustering, on the other
hand, is used to divide messages into different groups; each group containing similar
patterns of writing style features [13].
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Input: An anonymous message w
Input: Messages fM1;    ;Mng by fS1;    ;Sng.
1: for all Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng do
2: DivideMi into groups fG1i ;    ;Gki g;
3: for all Ggi 2 fG1i ;    ;Gki g do





7: for all Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng do
8: for all Ggi 2 fG1i ;    ;Gki g do
9: for all M j 2 fMi+1;    ;Mng do
10: for all Ghj 2 fG1j ;    ;Gkjg do
11: if Ggi 6= Ghj then
12: for all frequent stylometric pattern Px 2 FP(Ggi ) do
13: for all frequent stylometric pattern Py 2 FP(Ghj) do
14: if Px = Py then












27: for all Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng do
28: for all Ggi 2 fG1i ;    ;Gki g do
29: if Score(wWP(Ggi )> highest_score then








The process of clustering in both cases is the same. The difference is in the de-
tails of the preprocessing and feature extraction phase. In content-based clustering the
preprocessing step is similar to the usual text mining process where the style markers
(function words and punctuations), white and blank spaces are deleted along with other
irrelevant parts of a document. The remaining content is tokenized and stemmed to obtain
a list of topic words. The preprocessing phase in stylometry-based clustering is complex
where most of the message content, including topic words and style markers, are used
as features. Once all the e-mail messages of each author are converted into feature vec-
tors, clustering is applied. We use three clustering algorithms: Expectation Maximization
(EM), k-means, and bisecting k-means. Clustering is applied to e-mails of each author
independently. The resultant clusters of each suspect Si, are labeled as fG1i ;    ;Gki g.
Similarly, e-mail messages of S j are clustered separately into clusters fG1j ;    ;Gkjg.
Grouping based on Message Header: We divide e-mail messages of each suspect
into different groups based on header-content including e-mail recipient and e-mail time
stamp. The intuition behind using the time stamp for grouping is that some researchers,
like J. Stolfo et al. [101], believe that people behave differently at different times of the
day and night.
People usually communicate with different categories of people at different times.
For instance, most of the e-mails that a person writes during day time are exchanged with
his/her co-workers. Similarly, e-mail messages written in the evening may be exchanged
with his/her family members and friends. Likewise, very few of the e-mail messages that
are exchanged at midnight may be written to one’s job colleagues. For simplicity, we
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divide the 24 hours into three time brackets: morning, evening, and night. Therefore,
e-mails of a sender are divided into three categories: e-mails sent in the morning, e-mails
sent in the evening, and those sent at night.
Extracting Frequent Stylometric Patterns: Step 2 (Lines 3-6 in Algorithm 4.2) ex-
tracts the frequent stylometric patterns from each group Ggi for each message set Mi of
suspect Si. Frequent stylometric patterns fFP(G1i ;    ;FP(Gki )g from message subsets
fG1i ;    ;Gki g of suspect Si are extracted by using the technique described in Section 4.3.1.
Filtering Common Stylometric Patterns: Step 3 (Lines 7-25 in Algorithm 4.2) fil-
ters out the common stylometric frequent patterns between any two sets FP(Ggi ) and
FP(Ghj) where i 6= j. As described in Section 4.3.1, the general idea is to compare ev-
ery frequent pattern Px in FP(G
g
i ) with each frequent pattern Py in all other sets, e.g.,
FP(Ghj), and to remove them from FP(G
g
i ) and FP(G
h
j) if Px and Py are the same. The
computational complexity of this step is O(j [FP(Ggi )j2), where j [FP(Ggi )j is the total
number of stylometric frequent patterns. The remaining stylometic frequent patterns in
FP(Ggi ) represents a sub-writeprintWP(G
g
i ) of suspect Si. A suspect Si may have multi-
ple sub-writeprints, denoted by fWP(G1i );    ;WP(Gki )g depending on how the messages
are grouped in Step 1.
Example 4.3.4. Suppose there are two suspects S1 and S2 having two sets of text mes-
sages M1 and M2, respectively, where M1 is divided into groups G11 and G
2
1, and M2




1) = ffX1g;fY1g;fX1;Y1gg, FP(G21) =
ffX1g;fY2g;fX1;Y2gg, FP(G12)= ffX1g;fZ1g;fX1;Z1gg, FP(G22)= ffY2g;fZ2g;fX2;Z2gg.
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After filtering,WP(G11)= ffY1g;fX1;Y1gg,WP(G21)= ffX1;Y2gg,WP(G12)= ffZ1g;fX1;Z1gg,
WP(G22) = ffZ2g;fX2;Z2gg
Identifying Author: Step 4 (Lines 26-35 in Algorithm 4.2) determines the author of the
anonymous message w by comparing w with each writeprint WP(Ggi ) of every suspect
Si and identifying the writeprint that is similar to w. Intuitively, a writeprint WP(G
g
i )
is similar to w if many frequent stylometric patterns in WP(Ggi ) match the stylometric
feature items found in w.
The score function in Equation 4.2 is the modified form of Equation 4.1, which
is used to measure the similarity between the anonymous message w and a writeprint






where MP = fMP1;    ;MPrg is a set of matched patterns between WP(Ggi ) and the
anonymous message w. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the higher the score means the
higher similarity between the writeprint and the malicious message w. The message w is
assigned to the writeprint of a message group Gga with the highest score. The suspect Sa
of the group Gga is the plausible author of w among the suspects.
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4.4 Experiments and Discussion
The objectives of the experiments are: (1) to evaluate the two proposed methods, Au-
thorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2, in terms of authorship identification accuracy and to ver-
ify if the extracted writeprint exhibits strong evidence for supporting the conclusion on
authorship attribution; (2) to measure the effect of the number of authors on the results;
(3) to study the effect of the interval size and minimum support on the classification ac-
curacy of AuthorMiner1; (4) to gauge the effects of the training size of a suspect on the
conclusions; (5) to compare the accuracy score of the two methods with some previously
developed classification methods.
In our experiments, we use 285 stylometric features including 99 lexical features,
158 syntactic features (150 function words and 8 punctuation marks), 15 structural fea-
tures, and 13 domain-specific features. The features used in this study are discussed in
Section 4.2.1. The function words used in our study are listed in Appendix I. Thirteen
content-specific terms that are common across the Enron dataset are used.
We perform our experiments on the publicly available e-mail corpus, the Enron
e-mail dataset2, written by former Enron employees. After preprocessing, the corpus
contains 200,399 real-life e-mails from 158 individuals [22]. To evaluate the authorship
identification accuracy of our method, we randomly select n employees from the Enron
e-mail dataset, representing n suspects fS1;    ; Sng. For each suspect Si, we choose m
of Si’s e-mails, where 23 of the m e-mail messages are for training and the remaining
1
3 of the m e-mail messages are for testing. Next, we apply AuthorMiner1, to extract
2http://www.cs.cmu.edu/enron/
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the writeprints of fS1;    ;Sng from the training set and then determine the author of
each e-mail in the testing set. The authorship identification accuracy is measured by the
percentage of correctly matched authors in the testing set.
The experimental results of the two approaches, AuthorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2,
are discussed separately in the following two subsections.
4.4.1 AuthorMiner1
The purpose of experiments in this section is, to evaluate the presented approach of
writeprint mining in authorship attribution from three main aspects. First, keeping the
number of authors n and training size m constant, we study the effect of the number of
discretized intervals and minimum support min_sup on the identification accuracy. Sec-
ond, we measure the effect of the number of authors n on the classification score. Third,


























































(c) No. of discretized intervals = 6
Figure 4.3: Accuracy vs. Min_sup, No. of discretized intervals (Authors= 6,Messages=
20)
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In the first set of experiments, we consider six authors and selecting 20 messages for
each author from Enron dataset. We discretize the normalized values of each feature into
three intervals, i.e., 2, 4, and 6 and choosing the minimum support threshold min_sup
= 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. The experimental results are depicted in Figure 4.3. The
accuracy spans from 67% to 89% at min_sup = 0:5 through 0:1 (i.e., decrementing each
successive value by 0.1), suggesting that our proposed method can effectively identify the
author of an anonymous message based on the extracted writeprints when a reasonable
min_sup is specified. As min_sup increases, the number of extracted frequent patterns,
i.e., jFP(Mi)j, decreases and the extracted frequent patterns tend to capture the general
writing style that is common to other suspects, thus, are likely to be eliminated by the
filtering process of our method. As a result, the writeprint becomes less effective for
authorship identification and the accuracy decreases.
In the effort to study the effect of the number of discretized intervals on the ac-
curacy, we measure the authorship identification accuracy with respect to the number of
intervals. We keep the number of authors n and the training size m constant. Figure 4.3
illustrates that the accuracy remains constant for different number of discretized intervals
for a given min_sup, suggesting that our method is robust to the number of intervals.
Figure 4.4 depicts the effect of changing the number of authors on the authorship
identification accuracy. We consider 6, 12, and 18 authors with 20 messages per author
while keeping the interval size constant, i.e., 6. The accuracy drops from 89% for six
authors to 80% for 18 authors. The accuracy drop is relatively small compared to the
increase in the number of suspects. Most traditional classifiers usually have a significant
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drop as the number of target classes (suspects) increases. These results suggest that our
proposed method can effectively identify the author of a message when the candidate list






















































(c) No. of authors = 18
Figure 4.4: Accuracy vs. No. of authors (Messages = 20, No. of discretized intervals =
6)
The third set of experiments is designed to gauge the effect of sample size on the
attribution accuracy while keeping all other parameters constant. By varying the number
of messages per author m from 10 to 40, i.e., a multiple of 10, the accuracy spans from
87% to 89%, as shown in Figure 4.5. Though the change is not significant, however, it
indicates that the accuracy increases by increasing the sample size of the suspects.
In addition to measuring the quality of writeprint using classification accuracy, we
also manually examined the extracted writeprints and found that frequent patterns can
succinctly capture combinations of features that occur frequently in a suspect’s e-mails.
Many of those hidden patterns are not obvious. Due to the fact that all the matched fre-
quent patterns can be found in the anonymous (malicious) message, the frequent patterns

















No. of messages per author
Figure 4.5: Accuracy vs. No. of messages per author (Authors = 6, No. of discretized
intervals = 6, Min_sup= 0:1)
4.4.2 AuthorMiner2
The objective of our experiments is, to evaluate the accuracy of AuthorMiner2 in au-
thorship identification of anonymous messages. Next, we compare the accuracy of Au-
thorMiner2 with AuthorMiner1 as well as with few other authorship classification tech-
niques. An identification is correct if the AuthorMiner2 or the traditional classification
method can correctly identify the true author of an anonymous text message among the
group of suspects. We employ 10-fold cross-validation to measure the authorship iden-
tification accuracy. The experiments are repeated for 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 authors while
keeping the training and testing set constant, i.e., 40 messages per author.
The experimental result of AuthorMiner2 for calculating authorship identification
score is depicted in Figure 4.6. The accuracy drops from 92.37% to 71.19% by increas-



















Figure 4.6: Experimental results of AuthorMiner2
approach increases by 2-8% as compared to AuthorMiner1. The authorship accuracy
can be further improved by using a dataset that truly reflects the phenomenon of volatile
stylistics. Because most of the e-mails in Enron dataset are official and are written to co-
workers. The corpus does not contain messages written to friends and family members
and of course it does not contain malicious e-mails.
Figure 4.7 depicts the average identification accuracy of AuthorMiner1, AuthorMiner2,
and six classification methods namely Radial Basis Function Network (RBFNetwork) [18],
Ensemble of Nested Dichotomies (END) [44], J48 [87], NaiveBayes [91], and BayesNet [82].
These methods are chosen because they are either popular in the field or the state-of-the-
arts in their category. For example, RBFNetwork is an artificial neural network, J48 is a
commonly employed decision tree classification method, and Naive Bayes is often used
as a benchmark classifier for comparison. The selected classifiers are implemented in
WEKA [111]
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The identification accuracy is calculated for 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 authors in all the
methods. The newly proposed method, AuthorMiner2, outperforms all other techniques
including AuthorMiner1. The two probability classifiers, i.e., Naive Bayes and BayesNet
with accuracy score of 70% performed poorly for the given dataset. A similar accuracy
trend can be seen in some previous studies including [121] and [50]. In some real-life






















Figure 4.7: Comparing AuthorMiner2 with existing techniques
Figure 4.7 also suggests that the accuracy of AuthorMiner2 is relatively flat, as
compared to other methods, implying that it is more robust to the change in the number
of suspects. Furthermore, AuthorMiner2 can precisely model the sub-writeprints of a
suspect in a presentable format. Other methods do not share this merit. The consistency
in results of AuthorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2 indicates the robustness of our frequent-
pattern-based writeprint mining for authorship identification.
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AuthorMiner2 vs. END J48 RBFNetwork NaiveBays BaysNet AuthorMiner1
test statistic value 2.966 3.242 5.555 8.552 5.207 2.848
reject H0? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 4.6: Paired t test (a= 0:05, d f = 4, critical value t0:05;4 = 2:132)
The accuracy gap between AuthorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2 widens as the number
of suspects increases. The improvement of AuthorMiner2 over AuthorMiner1 is con-
tributed by the precise modeling of sub-writeprints.
To illustrate the statistical significance of the performance difference between Au-
thorMiner2 and other methods, we perform a paired t-test on the data in Figure 4.7
with the null hypothesis H0 : µD = 0 and the alternative hypothesis Ha : µD > 0 where
µD = µAuthorMiner2  µother_method . H0 will be rejected if the test statistic value is greater
than or equal to the critical value t0:05;4 = 2:132 at significance level 0.05. H0 is rejected
in all cases as shown in Table 4.6. The experimental result strongly suggests that the
performance of AuthorMiner2 is better than the other six compared methods.
The choice of minimum support threshold min_sup affects the identification ac-
curacy of our approach. Increasing the value of min_sup decreases the accuracy as the
number of non-frequent patterns increases. The dropping such patterns we tend to loose
at least some information. The accuracy score is relatively consistent by keeping min_sup
between 0.1 to 0.3. The efficiency is inversely proportional to minimum support due to
the increased number of frequent patterns.
The authorship identification process includes reading files, identifying writeprints,
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and classifying an anonymous e-mail. The total runtime is dominated by the Apriori-
based process of the frequent stylometric extraction in the writeprint identification pro-
cess. Thus, the complexity of AuthorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2 is the same as the com-
plexity of Apriori, which isO(jU jljMij), where jU j is the number of distinct stylometric
feature items, l is the maximum number of stylometric features of any e-mail, and jMij
is the number of training samples from suspect Si. In practice, l usually peaks at 2 [55].
For any test case of AuthorMiner2 shown in Figure 4.7, the total runtime is less than 7
minutes.
In addition to identification accuracy, AuthorMiner1 and AuthorMiner2 can pre-
cisely model the writeprint of a suspect in a presentable format. For example, the writeprint
of an author called fossum-d consists of 86 frequent stylometric patterns. We show two
of them below:
{f91:low, f92:low} with support = 23
{f243:high, f244:high} with support = 18
where f91 measures the ratio of the number of distinct words and total words, f92 mea-
sures the vocabulary richness using hapax legomena, f243 measures the frequency of the
function word “where”, and f244measures the frequency of the function word “whether”.
These two patterns imply that fossum-d’s vocabulary richness is low and fossum-d often
uses the words “where” and “whether” in his/her e-mails.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have defined two authorship identification problems. First, attribution
of an anonymous message to the true author by ignoring the occasional stylistic variation
of the potential authors. Second, attribution of an anonymous message with contextual
stylistic change of potential suspects. The first problem is further refined into three sub-
problems: (1) extracting the writeprint of a suspect; (2) identifying the author of a ma-
licious e-mail; and (3) collecting evidence for supporting the conclusion on authorship.
Generally, the same methodology is applied in the court of law for resolving the attribu-
tion issues. Most previous contributions focused on improving the classification accuracy
of authorship identification, but only few of them studied how to gather strong evidence
for the court of law.
To address the first problem, we introduce a novel approach of authorship attribu-
tion and formulate a new notion of writeprint based on the concept of frequent patterns.
Unlike the writeprints in previous literature that are a set of predefined features, our no-
tion of writeprint is dynamically extracted from the data as combinations of features that
occur frequently in a suspect’s messages, but not frequently in other suspect’s messages.
The experimental results on real-life e-mail dataset suggest that the identified writeprint
does not only help identifying the author of anonymous e-mail, but also presents intu-
itive yet strong evidence for supporting the authorship finding. Due to its intuitiveness,
non-technical personnel including the judge and jury in a law court can understand it.
To address the second problem, we extend and improve our approach of frequent
pattern-based writeprint to capture the sub-styles of a suspect by creating sub-writeprints
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of a suspect. Comparing the accuracy score of AuthorMiner2 with AuthorMiner1 and
some other techniques, suggests that by focusing on the sub-stylistics of an author prior
to applying attribution methods increases the accuracy of the system.
This novel approach opens up a new promising direction of authorship attribution.
We will further extend our tool to adopt different types of stylometric features and utilize
the concept of frequent patterns to identify hidden writeprint of individuals for the purpose
of messaging forensics. Similarly, more interesting results can be obtained by using the
proposed approach on real e-mail traffic containing malicious messages.
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Chapter 5
Authorship Attribution with Few
Training Samples
The problem defined in this chapter is different in two aspects from the traditional au-
thorship identification problem, discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. First, the
traditional authorship attribution studies [34, 121] assume to have large training samples
of each candidate author, enough to build a classification model. In the current problem,
we assume to have few training samples for each suspect. In some scenarios no training
samples may exist and the suspects may be asked (usually through court orders) to pro-
duce a writing sample for investigation purposes. Second, in traditional authorship studies
the problem is to attribute a single anonymous document to its true author. In the current
study we assume to have more than one anonymous messages that need to be attributed to
the true author(s). It is likely that the perpetrator may either create a ghost e-mail account
or hack an existing account and then use it for sending illegitimate messages.
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To address the aforementioned shortfalls, we redefine the authorship attribution
problem as follows: given a collection of anonymous messages potentially written by
a set of suspects fS1;    ;Sng, a cybercrime investigator first wants to identify the major
groups of messages based on stylometric features; intuitively, each message group is writ-
ten by one suspect. Then s/he wants to identify the author of each anonymous message


























































Figure 5.1: AuthorMinerSmall: Authorship identification with small training samples
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We extend our stylometric pattern-based approach of AuthorMiner1 (described in
Chapter 4), called AuthorMinerSmall, to address the newly defined problem. First, we
extract the stylometric features from the given anonymous message collection W. As
described in Section 2.3.1, the stylometric features include lexical features, style markers
(punctuations and function words), structural features, and content-specific features. Each
message is converted into a feature vector using vector space model representation. Then,
we apply stylometry-based clustering to cluster the given messages into different groups.
The intuition is that clustering by stylometric features can group the messages of the same
author together. The subsequent steps of the proposed method are applicable only if this
hypothesis is true. Our experimental results support the hypothesis.
Note that clustering applied in this chapter is different from traditional text clus-
tering [46, 66] in two ways. First, the objective of the traditional clustering is to identify
the different topics contained in the documents in question. The purpose of clustering
in our context is to identify pertinent writing styles in the messages. Second, traditional
clustering is applied on the basis of content-specific words, while in our case clustering is
applied on the basis of stylometric features.
Messages of each cluster are used to extract the frequent stylometric patterns by
applying our first approach, AuthorMiner1, described in Chapter 4. To compute the
writeprint of a clusterCi 2 fC1;    ;Ckg, the stylometric patterns shared by more than one
cluster are deleted. Next, the stylometric patterns fP(M1);    ;P(Mk)g from the training
samples fM1;    ;Mkg of the suspects are extracted. Finally, we compare each writeprint
WP(C j) with every pattern P(Mi)2 fP(M1);    ;P(Mk)g to identify the most conceivable
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author Sa of clusterC j.
Cluster analysis provides the crime investigator a deep insight on the writing styles
found in the given anonymous e-mails, in which the clusters and the extracted writeprint
could serve as input information for higher-level data mining. To investigate the rela-
tive discriminating power of different stylometric features, clustering is applied to each
feature type (i.e., lexical, syntactic, structural, and content-specific) separately. In our
experiments, we gauge the effects of the number of authors and the size of training set on
the purity of clusters. Using visualization and browsing features of our developed tool, an
investigator can explore the process of cluster formation and evaluation.
We summarize the contributions of this research work as follows:
• Attribution based on few training samples: Existing authorship identification meth-
ods often require a reasonably large number of training samples in order to build a
classification model. Our proposed method is effective even if only a few training
samples exist.
• Clustering by stylometric features: In the data mining community, content-based
clustering is used to cluster messages into different groups based on the topic. Em-
ploying the same notion, our experimental results on a real-life e-mail corpus (En-
ron e-mail corpus [22]) suggest that clustering by stylometric features is a sensible
method to group together messages written by the same person.
• Cluster analysis: We propose a method and develop a tool for an investigator to vi-
sualize, browse, and explore the writing styles extracted from a collection of anony-
mous e-mails. The relative strength of different clustering algorithms is evaluated.
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Our study reveals the relative discriminating power of four different categories of
stylometric features. We study the effects of the number of suspects as well as the
number of messages per suspect on the clustering accuracy.
• Dataset attribution: Our proposed method can be used to attribute a collection
of messages (e.g., anonymous message or a ghost e-mail account) to its plausible
author.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 defines the prob-
lem statement. Section 5.2 presents the approach of dataset attribution based on small
training data. Section 5.3 examines the viability of the proposed approach based on ex-
periments on real-life dataset. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
5.1 Problem Statement
The problem of authorship attribution with few training samples is to identify the most
plausible author Sa of a set of anonymous text messages W from a group of suspects
fS1;    ;Sng, with only few sample text messages Mi for each suspect Si. Note, this prob-
lem is different from the first problem in Definition 4.1.1: (1) The number of training
samples jMij is small (say less than 30 sample e-mails). Therefore, it is infeasible to build
a classifier as in the traditional classification method [60, 121] or to extract the frequent
stylometric patterns based on low support counts. (2) The first problem focuses on how to
identify the author of one anonymous message. In contrast, this problem focuses on how
to cluster the anonymous text messages by stylometric features such that the messages of
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each cluster are written by the same author, and how to identify the author of each cluster
of anonymous messages. The investigator needs to support his findings with convincing
evidence. The problem is formally described as follows.
Definition 5.1.1 (Authorship attribution with few training samples). Let W be a set of
anonymous text messages. Let fS1;    ;Sng be a set of suspected authors of W. Let
fM1;    ;Mng be the sets of text messages previously written by suspects fS1;    ;Sng,
respectively. Assume jMij is very small. The problem is to first group the messages W
into clusters fC1;    ;Ckg by stylometric features, and then to identify the plausible author
Sa from fS1;    ;Sng for each cluster of anonymous messages C j 2 fC1;    ;Ckg, with
presentable evidence. The most plausible author Sa ofC j is the suspect whose stylometric
patterns P(Mi) have the “best match” with writeprint WP(C j).
5.2 Proposed Approach
The general idea of our proposed method, depicted in Figure 5.1, is composed of five
steps. Step 1 involves the preprocessing, feature extraction, and normalization. Step 2 is
grouping anonymous messages W into clusters fC1;    ;Ckg by stylometric features such
that each cluster contains the anonymous messages written by the same suspect. Step
3 is feature discretization and frequent stylometric patterns mining from each cluster of
messages. Step 4 is calculating the writeprint of each cluster by filtering the frequent sty-
lometric patterns shared by two or more clusters. Step 5 is identifying the most plausible
author Sa of each clusterC j by comparing the extracted writeprintWP(C j) with every set
of training samples Mi 2 fM1;    ;Mng.
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5.2.1 Preprocessing
The preprocessing applied in this section is different from the preprocessing applied in the
previous chapter. In this chapter, we do not apply discretization after the usual process of
cleaning, tokenization, stemming, and feature extraction. Discretization is applied after
the clusters are formed in the next section. Similarly, the preprocessing step of stylometry-
based clustering [58] is different from the traditional text clustering [69]. In the traditional
text clustering only the content-specific words are counted while in stylometry-based clus-
tering, the stylometric features are extracted in addition to the content-specific words.
Using vector space model representation, each message µ is converted into a 285-
dimensional vector of features µ= fXi;Yj;Zkg, as shown in Table 5.2. When all messages
are converted into feature vectors, normalization is applied to the columns as needed.
Discretization of the extracted features fX ;Y;Zg into respective feature items is done
after the clustering phase.
5.2.2 Clustering by Stylometric Features
Clustering groups the anonymous messages W into different clusters fC1; : : : ;Ckg on the
basis of stylometric features. The hypothesis is that the writing style of every suspect is
different, so clustering by stylometric features could group the messages written by the
same author into one cluster. The experimental results in our previous work [59] support
the hypothesis. This clustering step is very different from AuthorMiner1 in Section 4.3.1,
which groups training samples with the goal of identifying the sub-writeprints of a sus-
pect. In contrast, the reason of clustering anonymous messages in AuthorMinerSmall is to
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facilitate more precise writeprint extraction, which is otherwise impossible due to small
training data.
One can apply any clustering methods, such as k-means, to group the anonymous
messages into clusters fC1; : : : ;Ckg such that messages in the same cluster have similar
stylometric features and messages in different clusters have different stylometric features.
Often, k is an input parameter to a clustering algorithm. In this case, k can be the number
of suspects.
We evaluate our proposed method by employing three clustering algorithms: Ex-
pectation Maximization (EM), k-means, and bisecting k-means. We choose the k-means
clustering algorithm [53] because it is known to be both simple and effective. The k-
means algorithm partitions a set of objects into k sub-classes. It attempts to find the
centers of natural clusters in the data by assuming that the object attributes form a vector
space, and minimizing the intra-cluster variance. Thus, k-means generally forms, circular
clusters around a centroid, and the algorithm outputs the centroids. k-means is particu-
larly applicable to numeric attributes. Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, first
proposed in [37], is often employed where it is hard to predict the value of k (number
of clusters). For instance, during forensic analysis of anonymous e-mails, an investigator
may not know the total number of suspects (or different writing styles) within a collec-
tion. In a more common scenario, a user may want to validate the results obtained by
other clustering algorithms say k-means, or bisecting k-means.
Suppose we have 12 anonymous messages and after applying clustering we obtain
three clusters denoted by fC1;C2;C3g as shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Clusters with member messages













To measure the purity of clusters and validate our experimental results, we use the
F-measure [46]. F-measure is derived from precision and recall, the accuracy measures
commonly employed in the field of information retrieval. The aforementioned three func-











where Opq is the number of members of actual (natural) class Np in cluster Cq, Np is the
actual class of a data object Opq and Cq is the assigned cluster of Opq.
102
5.2.3 Frequent Stylometric Pattern Mining
Once clusters fC1;    ;Ckg are formed, the next step is to calculate the writeprint of each
clusterCi 2 fC1;    ;Ckg. The pattern mining helps unveil the hidden association between
different stylometric features. By feature items, we mean the discretized value of a fea-
ture, which is discussed in the following paragraph. We capture such frequently occurred
patterns by the concept of frequent itemset [7], in a way similar to the one described
in [60] and Chapter 4 of this thesis.
Table 5.2: Clustered messages after discretization













To extract frequent stylometric patterns from each cluster, we apply Apriori algo-
rithm [7]. The Apriori algorithm can not be applied to numeric data. Therefore, we need
to split feature values into appropriate intervals. For this, we discretize each normal-
ized frequency of a feature Fa 2 fF1;    ;Fgg into a set of intervals fi1;    ; ihg, called
feature items. Detailed description of our proposed discretization method is given in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. Table 5.2 shows the discretized form of the messages shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.3: Frequent stylometric patterns for clusters C1,C2,C3




Detailed description of extracting frequent stylometric patterns from e-mail mes-
sages, is given in Section 4.3.1.
We use a running example to explain the proposed approach of writing style min-
ing. Suppose we have three clusters, C1 with messages fµ1;µ2;µ3;µ4g, C2 with messages
fµ5;µ6;µ7;µ8g, and C3 containing messages fµ9;µ10;µ11;µ12g, as shown in Table 5.2. To
calculate frequent stylometric patterns for each cluster, we assume that the user-defined
min_sup = 0:5. It means that a pattern P is frequent in Ci if at least 2 out of 4 e-mails
(by truncating the decimal part) within a cluster Ci contain all feature items in P. The
frequent stylometric patterns associated with each cluster are shown in Table 5.3. For
instance, pattern fX2;Y1;Z1g is a frequent pattern inC1 because at least 2 out of 4 e-mails
of cluster C1 contain this pattern. The lists of frequent stylometric patterns are shown in
Table 5.3.
5.2.4 Writeprint Mining
A writeprint is the disjoint set of frequent stylometric features. Therefore, the patterns
that are shared by more than one clusters are dropped. For instance, in our example, fX2g
and fX2;Y1g are shared by cluster C1 and C3, fY1g is shared by all the three clusters.
fX2;Y1g is shared by C1 and C3. Therefore, these patterns are deleted. The remaining
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frequent patterns constitute the unique writeprints WP(C1);WP(C2);WP(C3), as shown
in Table 5.4.
5.2.5 Identifying Author
In this section, we identify the most plausible author for each cluster of anonymous mes-
sages C j by comparingWP(C j) with the training samples fM1;    ;Mng. For each mes-
sage in Mi, we extract the stylometric feature items, denoted by fP(M1);    ;P(Mn)g. If
there are two or more samples, we take the average of the feature items over all the mes-
sages in Mi. The similarity between Ci and Mi is computed by using Equation 5.4. The




where MP= fMP1;    ;MPpg is a set of matched patterns betweenWP(Ci) and the mes-
sage sample Mi of suspect Si. The score is a real number within the range of [0;1]. The
higher the score means the higher the similarity between the cluster writeprint WP(Ci)
and the message sample Mi. The author of message sample Mi having the highest score
for a cluster is the true author of that cluster.
Suppose a message M1 contains two patterns fX3g and fY1;Z2g. Suppose the sup-
port of fX3g is 2 in cluster C2 and the support of fY1;Z2g in cluster C3 is 4. Using
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Equation 5.4 the score of cluster C2 for M1 is 0.4 and that of cluster C3 is 4. Therefore,
cluster C3 is attributed to suspect S1. The same process is repeated for the remaining two
clusters as well.
In an unlikely case where multiple suspects have the same highest score for a given
cluster, the strategy discussed in Section 4.3.1 is applied.
5.3 Experiments and Discussion
The objective of our experiments is to evaluate the authorship identification accuracy
of the proposed approach AuthorMinerSmall. For this, first we show that clustering by
stylometric features can be employed to group together the messages of an author. This
is a two step process. First, we cluster the randomly selected messages. Second, we use
F-measure [67] to measure the similarity between the cluster solution and the true author
labels. The higher the F-measure implies the better the cluster quality. F-measure has a
range [0,1].
The cluster analysis experiments help answer the following questions. Which of the
clustering algorithm perform better than others for a given message dataset? What is the
relative strength of each of the four different types of writing style features? What is the
effect of changing the number of authors on the experimental results? What is the effect
of changing the number of messages per author on the cluster quality.
To find the answer of first question, we employ three clustering algorithms, namely
Expectation-Maximization (EM), k-means, and bisecting k-means. The cluster quality
of the three algorithms is measured while all other parameters, e.g., stylometric features,
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number of authors, and size of training data are kept constant. To answer the second ques-
tion, we apply clustering over 15 different combinations of stylometric features. Next, we
change the number of authors while keeping other parameters, e.g., feature set and size
of training samples, constant. In the fourth set of experiments, we check the effects of
changing the number of messages per author on the clustering result.
We use a real-life dataset, Enron e-mails [22], which contains 200,399 e-mails of
about 150 employees of Enron corporation (after cleaning). We randomly selected h
employees from the Enron e-mail dataset, representing h authors fA1;    ;Ahg. For each
author Ai, we select x of Ai’s e-mails; where h varies from three to ten while value of x is

















EM k-means Bisecting k-means
Figure 5.2: F-measure vs. Feature type (Authors= 5, Messages= 40)
In the first set of experiments, we select 40 e-mails from each one of the five authors.
Results of the three clustering algorithms are shown in Figure 5.2. The value of F-measure
spans from 0.73 to 0.80 for EM, from 0.73 to 0.88 for k-means, and from 0.75 to 0.83
for bisecting k-means. The better result of k-means and bisecting k-means over EM (at
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least in this set of experiments) indicates that knowing the number of clusters k, one
can obtain better results. Result of k-means is better than bisecting k-means. Initially
these results seemed unexpected which were later on validated after completing all sets of
experiments. k-means performed better as compared to bisecting k-means for up to 40 e-
mails per author. By increasing the number of e-mails per author beyond 40, the accuracy
of bisecting k-means starts increasing. It suggests that bisecting k-means is more scalable
than EM and k-means.
The experimental results of Figure 5.2, help measure the discriminating power of
the different stylometric features. For this, we use 15 possible combinations of these
features. Looking at the individual features, content-specific features (denoted by T4)
perform poorly while style markers (denoted by T2) and structural features (denoted by
T3) produce best clustering results. These two trends are matching with the previous
stylometric studies [34, 121]. Over all, the best results are obtained by applying k-means
on T1+T2+T3+T4, i.e., the combination of all four types of features. By adding contents-
specific features to T1+T2+T3, we do not see any noticeable improvement in the accuracy
of EM and bisecting k-means. The selected keywords are probably common among e-
mails of the selected authors. Another important observation is that the performance of
T2+T3 is better than any other combination of two feature, e.g., T1+T2 and T1+T3.
In the second set of experiments, we consider use all the four types of stylomet-
ric features, i.e., T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 and select 40 messages per author. As depicted in
Figure 5.4, the experiments are repeated for 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 authors. The value of


















EM k-means Bisecting k-means
Figure 5.3: F-measure vs. No. of authors (Messages= 40, Features= T1+T2+T3+T4)
clustering algorithms drops as more authors are added to the experiments.
In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the effects of the training size by keeping
the number of authors (five) and feature set (T1+T2+T3+T4) unchanged. As depicted
in Figure 5.4, the value of F-measure increases by increasing the number of messages
per author. k-means and bisecting k-means achieve 90% purity for 40 messages per au-
thor while the results of EM are not consistent. Increasing the number of messages per
author beyond 40 negatively affect results of all the three algorithms. Among the three
algorithms, the accuracy of EM drops faster than the other two, and bisecting k-means is
more robust compared to simple k-means. These results explain the relative behavior of
these algorithms in terms of scalability.
The best accuracy is achieved by applying k-means over a combination of all four
feature types when e-mails per user is limited to 40. Bisecting k-means is a better choice
when there are more authors and the training set is larger. By taking into account the topic

















No. of messages per author
EM k-means Bisecting k-means
Figure 5.4: F-measure vs. No. of messages per author (Authors = 5, Features = T1+
T2+T3+T4)
One way could be to identify author-specific keywords by apply content-based clustering
on e-mails of each author separately. Results of EM are insignificant and are hard to
improve by parameter tuning.
Next, we evaluate the authorship identification accuracy of AuthorMinerSmall. We
randomly select 40 text messages from each suspect. Selecting 36 out of the 40 messages
from each suspect for training while the remaining 4 messages from each suspect are used
for testing. Let n be the number of suspects. Then, we cluster the 36 n messages by
stylometric features using k-means, and then match each cluster of anonymous messages
with the remaining 4 n messages with known authors. An identification is correct if
AuthorMinerSmall can correctly identify the true author of an anonymous text message
among the group of suspects.
Figure 5.5 depicts the authorship identification accuracy for AuthorMinerSmall
with the number of suspects ranging from 4 to 20. When the number of suspects is 4,



















Figure 5.5: AuthorMinerSmall: Accuracy vs. No. of authors
to 41.26%. Given that the training dataset is so small, the accuracy above 70% is in fact
very encouraging when the number of suspects is not too large.
The computational complexity of the AuthorMinerSmall is based on two phases. (1)
The computational complexity of clustering phase depends on the clustering algorithm.
For instance, it is O(k jWj) for k-means, where k is the number of clusters and jWj
is the number of anonymous messages. (2) The computational complexity of writeprint
extraction phase is O(jU jl  jCij  k), where jU j is the number of distinct stylometric
feature items, l is the maximum number of stylometric features of any e-mail, and jCij is
the number of anonymous messages in clusterCi. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, l usually
peaks at 2. For any test case of AuthorMinerSmall shown in Figure 5.5, the total runtime
is less than a minute.
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5.4 Summary
The non-availability of enough training samples of potential suspects is one of main lim-
itation of the criminal investigation process. To address this issue, we have presented a
method for authorship identification of anonymous messages based on few training sam-
ples. The approach is primarily based on the intuition that clustering by stylometric fea-
tures is a sensible method to divide text messages into different groups. We argue that the
hypothesis is true based on our experiments on real-life e-mails. Moreover, we show that
using cluster analysis, an investigator can get a deeper insight of the anonymous messages
and learn about the potential perpetrators. The writing styles in terms of feature patterns
provide more concrete evidence than producing some statistical numbers.
The identification accuracy of AuthorMinerSmall for up to ten suspects is high
while the accuracy above ten authors is low, which can be improved by tuning the pa-
rameters. For instance, selecting large size e-mails, increasing the number of stylometric
features, and using sophisticated distance functions can help improve the accuracy score
of the presented approach.
The current study suggests that content-specific keywords can be more effectively
used for authorship identification in specific contexts, e.g., cybercrime investigation. The
need is to develop robust techniques for selecting more appropriate words from the given
suspicious dataset. Another important research direction would be to identify optimized
set of stylometric features applicable in all domains. Most often contents of the same mes-
sage are written in more than one language. Therefore, addressing the issue of language




The problem of authorship characterization is to determine the sociolinguistic character-
istics of the potential author of a given anonymous text message. Unlike the problems of
authorship attribution, where the potential suspects and their training samples are acces-
sible for investigation, no candidate list of suspects is available in authorship characteri-
zation. Instead, the investigator is given one or more anonymous documents and is asked
to identify the sociolinguistic characteristics of the potential author of the documents in
question. Sociolinguistic characteristics include ethnicity, age, gender, level of education,
and religion [105].
In this chapter, we consider the worst case scenario of authorship characterization,
in which even the data from the sample population is not enough to build a classifier.
Our proposed approach, depicted in Figure 6.1, first applies stylometry-based clustering
on the given anonymous messages W to identify major stylistic groups. The intuition is
that clustering by stylometric features can cluster messages of an author in one group.
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This intuition is supported by experimental results in Section 5.3. A group of messages
is denoted by Ci 2 fC1;    ;Cng. Next, we train a model on messages collected from
the sample population. The developed model is employed to infer the characteristic of a
potential author of cluster Ci by identifying its class label (e.g., male/female).
Blog postings U 
from sample 
population 
Grouping based on 
target characteristic













Writeprint of each class dimension
Tagging clusters with 
the relevant class 
labels
Decision is based on majority class
Extracting 
Writeprints
Figure 6.1: AuthorCharacterizer: Inferring characteristics of anonymous author
We use a blog dataset in our experiments as most bloggers voluntarily post their per-
sonal characteristics on their blogs. The selected bloggers need to be from the same class
category that we want to infer in our experiments. For instance, to infer the gender of an
author, we need to collect blog postings of male and female bloggers. Next, we precisely
model the writeprint of each class category of the sample population by employing the
concept of frequent patterns [7], detailed in Chapter 4. The extracted writeprints are then
used to identify the class label of each message in a cluster Ci. We apply our approach
for predicting two characteristics: gender and region or location. In the remainder of this
chapter, we use the term “online messages” to indicate e-mail messages, blog postings,
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and chat logs.
The contributions of this study are summarized as follows:
• Characterization by frequent pattern-based writeprint: In traditional authorship
studies the characterization problem is addressed mostly by employing classifiers.
This is the first work to use frequent pattern-based writeprint to infer an author’s
characteristics. The writeprint, the combination of co-occurring stylistic features,
helps manifest the hidden association between the stylometric features.
• Preliminary information: Often, an investigator is provided with only a collection
of anonymous suspicious messages and is asked to collect forensically relevant ev-
idence from them. Clustering by stylometric features can be used to initiate the
investigation process by identifying groups of stylistics; each group, intuitively,
represents one suspect.
• Small sample population: Our frequent pattern-based approach can be used even
if the size of the sample population is small or their sample messages are small.
Koppel et al. [64] used blogs of approximately 47,000 bloggers, posted for one
year, much larger than the dataset used in our experiments.
• New category of characteristic: Existing studies have investigated characteristics
such as age, gender, educational level, and language background. We introduce a
new dimension of authorship profiling, called region or location. Our experiments
on blog postings collected from bloggers in Australia, Canada, and the United King-
dom suggest that the proposed method can be employed to predict (with certain
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accuracy) a suspect’s region.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 formally defines the
problem of authorship characterization. The proposed approach for addressing the char-
acterization problem is described in Section 6.2. The approach is evaluated by experi-
mentation on real-life data in Section 6.3. Summary of the chapter is given is Section 6.4.
6.1 Problem Statement
The problem of authorship characterization is defined as follows: Given a collection of
anonymous online messages potentially written by some suspects, the task of an investiga-
tor is to identify the cultural and demographic characteristics of each suspect. We assume
to have no candidate list of potential suspects and of course no training data from the
suspects. The investigator assumes to have access to some online messages with known
authors who come from the population of the suspects. The sample messages can be col-
lected from blog postings and social networks that explicitly disclose the authors’ public
profiles.
Definition 6.1.1 (Authorship characterization). Let W be a set of anonymous text mes-
sages potentially written by some suspects. The number of suspects may or may not be
known a priori. Both scenarios are addressed in this study. Let U be a set of online text
documents, collected from the same population of suspects, with known authors’ char-
acteristics. The problem of authorship characterization is to first group the messages
W into clusters fC1; : : : ;Ckg by stylometric features, then identify the characteristics of
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the author of each cluster C j by matching the writeprint extracted from the online text
documentsU .
6.2 Proposed Approach
To address the authorship problem in Definition 6.1.1, we propose a method, called Au-
thorCharacterizer, to characterize the properties of an unknown author of some anony-
mous messages. Figure 6.1 shows an overview of AuthorCharacterizer in three steps. Step
1 is identifying the major groups of stylometric features from a given set of anonymous
messages W. Step 2 is extracting the writeprints for different categories of online users
from the given sample documents U . Step 3 is characterizing the unknown authors of W
by comparing the writeprints with W.
6.2.1 Clustering Anonymous Messages
Once all anonymous messages contained in W are converted into feature vectors using
vector space model representation technique, the next step is to apply clustering. For
clustering, we have selected Expectation Maximization (EM), k-means, and bisecting k-
means clustering algorithms. Because, k-means is more commonly used than other meth-
ods while EM is the preferred choice if the number of clusters (the number of suspects in
our case) is not known a priori. Bisecting k-means performs better than k-means in terms
of accuracy. Clustering is applied on the basis of stylometric features, the way similar to
Section 5.2.2, which results in a set of clusters fC1; : : : ;Ckg. The only difference is that
the number of clusters k is the number of categories identified for a characteristic. For
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instance, k = 2 (male/female) for gender, k = 3 (Australia/Canada/United Kingdom) for
region or location.
6.2.2 Extracting Writeprints from Sample Messages
In our study, we use the blog postings collected from blogger.com because this website
allows bloggers to explicitly mention their personal information. Each blog posting is
converted into a set of stylometric feature items. Then we group them by the character-
istics that we want to make inferences on the anonymous messages C j. For example, if
we want to infer the author gender of cluster C j, we divide the blog postings into groups
G1; : : : ;Gk by gender. Next, we extract the writeprints, denoted by WP(Gx), from each
message group Gx, by employing the method described in Section 4.3.1.
6.2.3 Identifying Author Characteristics
The last step infers the characteristic of the author of anonymous messagesC j by compar-
ing the stylometric feature items of each message w in C j with the writeprintWP(Gx) of
every group Gx. The similarity between w andWP(Gx) is computed using Equation 6.1.
Message w is labeled with class x if WP(Gx) has the highest Score(w WP(Gx)). All





where MP = fMP1; : : : ;MPpg is a set of matched patterns between WP(Gx) and the
anonymous message w.
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6.3 Experiments and Discussion
The main objective of our experiments is to evaluate the accuracy of authorship character-
ization method, AuthorCharacterizer, based on the training data collected from blog post-
ings. We use 290 stylometric features including the 285 general features and 10 gender-
specific features. The 285 features are described in Section 4.2.1 while the gender-specific
features are listed in Appendix II and are described in [29].
The evaluation of AuthorCharacterizer has three steps. In the first step, we develop
a small robot program to collect blog postings with authors’ profiles from a blogger web-
site, group them by gender and location, and extract the writeprint of each group. For
characterizing the gender class, we collect 50 postings/messages for each gender type.
Thus, if the total number of suspects is n, we collect 50n2 blog postings in total. The
average size of each posting is about 300 words. For characterizing the location informa-
tion, we collect 737 postings from Australia, 800 postings from Canada, and 775 postings
from the United Kingdom. In the second step, we cluster the collected postings by stylo-
metric features, and use 2/3 of the messages for training and 1/3 for testing. In the third
step, we extract the writeprints from the training messages and characterize the testing
messages. A characterization of an anonymous message is correct if AuthorCharacterizer
can correctly identify the characteristic of the message.
Table 6.1 shows detailed experimental results for location identification. The actual
accuracy is the percentage of records that are correctly characterized in a class. The
weighted accuracy is normalized by the actual number of records having the class over
the total number of records. The sum is the sum of the weighted accuracy.
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Table 6.1: Experimental result for location identification





















The accuracy scores of identifying the gender and location are depicted in Figure 6.2
and Figure 6.3, respectively. The accuracy stays almost flat at around 60% for gender,
and decreases from 60.44% to 39.13% as the number of authors increases for location.
One apparent reason is the least number of classes in case of gender characterization.
The results suggest that the proposed frequent-pattern-based approach best fits to two
class classification problem. Another possible reason is the use of 11 gender-preferential







































Figure 6.3: Location identification: Accuracy vs. No. of authors
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6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a technique for addressing the worst case scenario of
characterization problem; meaning that even the training data from the sample population
is not sufficient. We evaluate the proposed method on blog dataset for two class dimen-
sions: gender and location. In all experimental sets our method has identified the class
labels correctly. Moreover, our notion of writeprint, presented in the form of frequent pat-
terns, is suitable for forensic purposes. Experimental results on real-life data suggest that
our proposed approach, together with the concept of frequent-pattern-based writeprint, is





In the previous chapters, we propose methods to address two authorship problems, i.e.,
authorship identification and authorship characterization. In this chapter, we discuss the
third authorship problem, called authorship verification. The proposed approach is appli-
cable to different types of online messages, but in the current study we focus on e-mail
messages.
The problem of authorship verification is to confirm whether or not a given suspect
is the true author of a disputed textual document. Some researchers define authorship ver-
ification as a similarity detection problem, especially in cases of plagiarism. In such sit-
uation, an investigator needs to decide whether or not the two given objects are produced
by the same entity. The object in question can be a piece of code, a textual document, or
an online message. More importantly, the conclusion drawn needs not only to be precise
but to be supported by strong presentable evidence as well.
The problems of authorship attribution and characterization, discussed in previous
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chapters, are relatively well-defined, but authorship verification is not. Sometimes, it is
considered as a one-class text classification problem while at another time as a two-class
classification problem. Some studies address the problem by determining the dissimilar-
ities between the writing styles of the suspect and a pseudo-suspect. Next, the metrics
employed for measuring verification result vary from study to study. The measures in-
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Figure 7.1: Overview of author verification approach
In this chapter, we formally define the problem of authorship verification and pro-
pose an authorship verification framework for e-mails. Our method is primarily based
on the speaker recognition evaluation (SRE) framework developed by the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [72], which has proven very successful in the
124
speech processing community. The SRE framework evaluates the performance of detec-
tion systems in terms of minDCF, false positive and false negative alarms represented by
employing a detection error trade-off (DET) curve, a deviant of the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve (see details in Section 7.1).
The overview of the proposed approach is shown in Figure 7.1. For two e-mail
datasets, one is collected from a very large sample population denoted byU , and the other
is confiscated from a potential suspect S. After the necessary preprocessing steps (clean-
ing, tokenization, stemming, and normalization), each e-mail is converted into a vector of
stylistics or stylometric features (discussed in Section 4.2.1). We apply classification and
regression techniques on both datasets. In each thread of techniques the datasets are fur-
ther divided into two subsets, the training and the testing sets. Two different models, one
each for suspect S, called hypothesized author and the alternate hypothesis, are trained
and validated.
The given anonymous e-mail is evaluated using the two models in both regression
and classification threads. Unlike the usual classification where the decision is made
solely on the basis of matching probability, here the decision to verify the author is based
on the threshold defined for the hypothesis testing. The threshold is calculated by varying
the relative number of false positives and false negatives, depending upon the nature of
the perceived application of the system. The accuracy of the system is judged in terms of
EER, represented by the DET curve, and the minDCF, as using only EER can be mislead-
ing [64].
125
Our experimental result on a real-life data, shows that the proposed verification
method has the following main contributions.
1. Adopting NIST Speaker Recognition Framework: We are the first to have success-
fully adopted the NIST’s SRE framework for addressing the issue of authorship
verification of textual content including e-mail dataset. We use different classifi-
cation and regression methods and were able to achieve an equal error rate of 17
percent and minDCF equal to 0.0671 with the SVM-RBF (support vector machine-
radial basis function).
2. Employing regression for binary classification: Regression functions, normally
used for predicting numeric attributes (class labels), are employed for taking bi-
nary decision about whether or not a suspect is the author of a disputed anonymous
document. It is evident from the experimental results that SVM with RBF kernel
produced the best verification accuracy with the lowest minDCF value as compared
to the classifiers used.
3. Proposing new error detection measures for authorship verification: To measure
the performance of most detection tasks, traditionally a ROC curve is used, where
false alarms are plotted against the correct detection rate. In this approach it is hard
to determine the relative ratio of both types of errors, which is crucial in criminal
investigation. The DET curve employed in this study can better analyze the exact
contribution of both the false positive and false negative values. The use of EER is
augmented with minDCF in gauging the framework accuracy.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 defines the problem
statement and different evaluation metrics. Section 7.2 presents our proposed method.
Section 7.3 shows the experimental results on a real-life e-mail dataset. Section 7.4 con-
cludes the chapter with suggestions for future work.
7.1 Problem Statement
Given a set of sample e-mails of a potential suspect S and an e-mail dataset U collected
from a very large population of authors, the task of an investigator is to verify whether
or not the disputed anonymous e-mail w is written by the suspect S. Mathematically, the
task of author verification can be termed as a basic hypothesis test between
H0: w is written by the hypothesized author S
and
H1: w is not written by the hypothesized author S.
The optimum test to decide between these two hypotheses is a likelihood ratio test
given by
p(µjH0)
p(µjH1)  q (7.1)
accept H0, otherwise reject H0 (accept H1) where p(µjHi); i= 0;1 is the probability den-
sity function for the hypothesis Hi evaluated for the observed e-mail w and q is the de-
cision threshold for accepting or rejecting H0. The basic goal is to find techniques for
calculating the two likelihood functions p(µjH0) and p(µjH1).
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The author-specific model H0 is well-defined and is built using e-mails written by
the hypothesized author while the model H1 is not well-defined as (potentially) it must
represent the entire space of the possible alternatives to the hypothesized author.
In order to define H1 model, we borrow the techniques used in the speaker verifi-
cation literature. Two main approaches have been in use for the alternative hypothesis
modeling in the speaker recognition research. The first approach is to use a set of other-
author models to cover the space of the alternative hypothesis. This set of authors is
called the cohort or the background authors. Given a set of N background author models
l1;l2;   lN , the alternative hypothesis model is represented by
p(µjH1) = f (p(µjl1); p(µjl2);    ; p(µjlN)) (7.2)
where f (:) is some function, such as average or maximum, of the likelihood values
from the background author set. The selection, size and combination of the background
authors can be the subject of further research.
Another approach is the alternative hypothesis modeling in which a model is devel-
oped on sample documents are collected from a very large number of individuals. The
model developed in this way is called the universal background model (UBM) in the
speech processing community. We adopted the same approach for online textual docu-
ments. Given a collection of e-mail samples from a very large number of authors, a single
model is trained to represent the alternative hypothesis. The main advantage of this ap-
proach is that a single author-independent model can be trained once for a particular task
and then used for all hypothesized authors in that task.
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Two types of errors can occur in the author verification system namely false re-
jection (rejecting a valid author) and false acceptance (accepting an invalid author). The
probability of these errors called false rejection probability Pf r and false alarm probability
Pf a. Both types of error depend on the value of user defined threshold q. It is, therefore,
possible to represent the performance of the system by plotting Pf a versus Pf r, the curve
generally known as DET curve in the speech processing community.
In order to judge the performance of the author verification systems, different per-
formance measures can be used. We borrow the two main measures namely Equal Error
Rate (EER) and Detection Cost Function (DCF) from the speech processing commu-
nity. The EER corresponds to the point on the DET curve where Pf a = Pf r. Since using
only EER can be misleading [64], we use the DCF in conjunction with EER to judge the
performance of author verification system.
The DCF , defined in Equation 7.3, is the weighted sum of miss and false alarm
probabilities [72]. The minDCF means the minimum value of Equation 7.3. The DET
curve is used to represent the number of false positives versus false negatives. The point
on the DET curve where the number of both the false alarms become equal is called EER.
The closer the DET curve to the origin, the minimum EER is and thus the better the
system is.
DCF =C f rPf rPtarget +C f aPf a (1 Ptarget) (7.3)
The parameters of the cost function are the relative costs of detection errors, C f r and
C f a and the a priori probability of the specified target author, Ptarget . In our method, we
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use the parameter values as specified in the NIST’s SRE framework. These values are
C f r = 10,C f a = 1 and Ptarget = 0:01.
The minimum cost detection function (minDCF) is redefined as the minimum value
of ‘0:1false rejection rate + 0:99false acceptance rate’. Since it is primarily depen-
dent on the false acceptance rate and false rejection rate and has nothing to do specifically
with the speech, it can be used for the authorship verification as well. It is in conformance
with the forensic analysis and strictly penalizes the false acceptance rate as it would im-
plicate an innocent person as the perpetrator.
7.2 Proposed Approach
In this thesis, we have addressed the authorship verification as a two-class classification
problem by building two models one from e-mails of the potential suspect and the other
from a very large e-mail dataset belonging to different individuals called universal back-
ground model. To train and validate the two representative models, we borrowed the
techniques from the SRE framework [72]. The framework is initiated by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. The purpose of the SRE framework is not only
to develop state-of-the-art frameworks for addressing the issues of speaker identification
and verification but to standardize and specify a common evaluation platform for judging
the performance of these systems as well.
The evaluation measures such as DCF, minDCF, and EER that are used in the SRE
framework are more tailored to forensic analysis as compared to simple ROC and clas-
sification accuracies. Another reason for borrowing ideas from the speaker recognition
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community is that this area has a long and rich scientific basis with more than 30 years of
research, development and evaluation [72]. The objective of both authorship and speaker
verification is the same, i.e., to find whether or not a particular unknown object is pro-
duced by a particular subject. The object in our case is the anonymous e-mail whereas in
case of speaker verification it is the speech segment. The subject is the speaker in their
case whereas it is the author in our case.
As depicted in Figure 7.1, the proposed method is a two step process: model devel-
opment and model application. In the first step, the given sample data is used to develop
and validate the classification model. Next, the disputed anonymous message is matched
with the model to verify its true author. Prior to model development, the given sample
messages are converted into features vectors. The features used in the current study are
described in Section 4.2.1.
To confirmwhether a given anonymous e-mailw belongs to the hypothesized author
(or suspect S) or not, is based on the scores produced by e-mail w during the classification
process and the threshold q. The threshold is defined by the user and is employed for
taking binary decision. As described in the following paragraphs, we use two approaches
for binary classification of e-mails.
7.2.1 Verification by Classification
In this approach the e-mails in the training set corresponding to the hypothesized author,
and that belonging to the sample population, are nominally labeled. During the testing
phase, a score is assigned to each e-mail on the basis of the probability assigned to the
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e-mail by the classifier. The scores calculated for the true author and the ‘imposters’ are
evaluated for the false acceptance and false rejection rates through a DET plot.
We use three different classification techniques, namely Adaboost.M1 [115], Dis-
criminative Multinomial Naive Bayes (DMNB) [103] and Bayesian Network [45] classi-
fiers. Most of the commonly used classification techniques including the one employed
in the current study are implemented in the WEKA toolkit [111].
7.2.2 Verification by Regression
Authorship verification is conceptually a classification problem but in our case we need
to take a binary decision of whether or not the message under test belongs to the potential
suspect. Similarly, as the decision is taken on the basis of the similarity score assigned to
the e-mail under test, we employ regression functions to calculate the score. We use three
different regression techniques including linear regression [111], SVM with Sequential
Minimum Optimization (SMO) [84], and SVM with RBF kernel [19]. We use regres-
sion scores for the true authors and for the impostors to calculating equal error rate and
minimum detection cost function.
We assign an integer to e-mails of the true author and those belong to the ‘im-
posters’. For instance, +10 is assigned to the hypothesized author’s e-mails and  10 to
e-mails of the target population. When have applied, the regression function assigns a
value generally between +10 and  10 to the disputed anonymous e-mail. The decision,
whether or not it belongs to the hypothesized author, is based on the resultant score and
the user defined threshold q.
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Setting the threshold too low will increase the false alarm probability whereas set-
ting it too high will have high miss probability (false rejection rate). In order to decide
about the optimum value of the threshold and to judge the performance of our verification
system, we plot the variation of the false alarm rate with the false rejection rate. The
curve is generally known as the detection error trade off curve, which is drawn on a devi-
ate scale [72]. The closer the curve to the origin, the better the verification system is. The
point on the curve where the false alarm rate equals the false rejection rate is called the
equal error rate.
7.3 Experiments and Discussion
To evaluate our implementation, we performed experiments on the Enron e-mail corpus
made available by MIT. First, we created a universal background model from the entire
Enron e-mail corpus. This is an author-independent model and is used as the basis for
taking the decision whether or not the e-mail in question belongs to the suspected author.
A separate model is created for each author. For this, we use 200 e-mails per author.
The decision whether an e-mail under test belongs to the hypothesized author or not
is based on the difference of similarity of the e-mail to the author-independent model and
that to the hypothesized author model. Based on this similarity metric, a score is assigned
to the disputed e-mail. For evaluation of our classification methods, we employed the
widely used 10-fold cross-validation approach by reserving 90% for training and 10% for
testing. The reason is to avoid any biaseness in during the evaluation process and to judge
the classification method over the entire database.
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One of the performance measure used in the SRE framework is to calculate the
equal error rate [72]. The EER is calculated by taking two types of scores as input namely
the true author score and the false author score, which in turn are calculated by the classi-
fication methods applied over the test dataset.
Verification by Classification. Figure 7.2, depicts the DET plot of the classification
results of one author, randomly selected from our database. Usually, the closer the DET
curve to the origin, the minimum the EER is and thus the better the system is. The point
on the DET plot which gives the minimum cost detection function is marked as a small
circle on each curve.
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Figure 7.2: DET for author verification using classification techniques
The DET curve plotted for Bayesian Network (BayesNet) is more consistent and
indicates better results both in terms of equal error rate and minimum cost detection func-
tion with less complexity. The value of minDCF for both DMNB and AdaBoost is com-
parable, however, performance of DMNB in terms of EER is closed to BayesNet. The
performance gap between the two classifiers is consistent in most of the experiments.
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Verification by Regression. Figure 7.3 shows the typical DET plot of one of the ran-
domly selected author from our database, constructed by using the scores obtained from
the three regression techniques as described above. The DET curve indicates that the
regression approach usually produce better results in terms of EER and minDCF as com-
pared to the classification approach. The regression approach via SVM with RBF kernel
with EER 17.1% outperformed linear regression (with EER = 19.3%) and SVM-SMO
(with EER = 22.3%). The same tendency of performance can be seen in minDCF values
as well (see the last row of Table 7.1). DET curves for linear regression and SVM-SMO
are running neck to neck starting with a highest value of false negative.
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Figure 7.3: DET for author verification using regression techniques
Table 7.1: Verification scores of classification and regression methods
Classification Regression
Verification A.Boost DMNB Bayes SVM-SMO Lin. Reg SVM-RBF
EER(%) 22.4 20.1 19.4 22.3 19.3 17.1
minDCF 0.0836 0.0858 0.0693 0.0921 0.0840 0.0671
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The conclusion is that SVM with RBF kernel produced the best verification accu-
racy with the lowest minDCF value. These results suggest that regression techniques are
more suitable in addressing verification problem than classifiers which perform better in
attribution issues. However, the same assumption may not be always true and the result
may change depending on the dataset as well as feature set used.
7.4 Summary
We have studied the problem of e-mail authorship verification and presented a solution
by adopting the NIST speaker verification framework and the accuracy measuring meth-
ods. The problem has been addressed as a two-class classification problem by building
two models one from e-mails of the potential suspect and the other from a very large
e-mail dataset belonging to different individuals called universal background model. Ex-
periments on a real-life dataset produces an equal error rate of 17% by employing support
vector machines with RBF kernel, a regression function. The results are comparable with
other state-of-the-art verification methods. Building a true ‘universal’ background model
is not an easy task due to the non-availability of sufficient sample e-mails. The style vari-
ation of the same suspect with the changing state of mind and the context in which he




In the previous chapters we have discussed about the different aspects of the authorship
analysis problem, while in this chapter we propose a framework to extract criminal infor-
mation from the textual content of suspicious online messages. Archives of online mes-
sages, including chat logs, e-mails, web forums, and blogs, often contain an enormous
amount of forensically relevant information about potential suspects and their illegitimate
activities. Such information is usually found either in the header or body of an online
document.
The IP addresses, host names, sender and recipient addresses contained in the e-mail
header, the user ID used in chatting, and the screen names used in web-based communi-
cation help reveal information at the user or application level. For instance, information
extracted from a suspicious e-mail corpus helps us learn who the senders and recipients
are, how often they communicate, how many types of communities/cliques are there in a








































































































Figure 8.1: Framework overview
or a community is a group of users having an online communication link between them.
Header-content or user level information is easy to extract and straightforward to use for
investigation.
The focus of this study is, to analyze the content or body of online messages for
extracting social networks and the users’ topic of discussion. In this context, the prob-
lem is defined as follows: Given a suspect machine, confiscated from a crime scene, an
investigator is asked to identify potential suspects who are associated with the primary
suspect S and to analyze the content of online documents exchanged between suspects.
The current study is focused on analyzing chat logs. The investigator is provided with a
taxonomy of certain street terms, representing certain crimes, that are generally found in
cybercrime-mediated textual conversation.
Though some studies on forensic analysis of online messages do exist, most of them
focus on only one small aspect of the cybercrime investigation process. For instance, [65]
focus on mining chat logs for collecting sociolinguistic characteristics of potential authors
of anonymous chat documents. The aim of [34, 122] is to develop a classification model
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for predicting the true author of an anonymous e-mail message. Alfonseca and Manand-
har [8] applied named entity recognition, a subtask of information extraction, to extract
information such as names of persons, organizations, places, or other contact information
from textual documents. Minkov et al. [76] developed a technique for extracting named-
entity information from informal documents such as e-mails. Chau et al. [95] proposed
criminal link analysis techniques, and Xiang et al. [112] propose crime data visualization
techniques for the Web- and Internet-level communication of cybercriminals. In [25], a
data mining framework is developed for analyzing different kinds of crimes.
In contrast, in this study we develop a framework for extracting and reporting foren-
sically relevant information from malicious online textual communication documents.
More importantly, the entire process is automated, including retrieving documents, ex-
tracting different kinds of information and presenting the findings in an intuitive way.
The proposed framework consists of three modules including clique miner, con-
cept miner, and information visualizer, as depicted in Figure 8.1. A clique, defined in
this context, is a group of entities co-occurring together in the textual contents of online
messages. The clique miner is designed to: first, identify the named entities appearing
in the given suspicious chat logs; second, group them according to the frequency of their
co-occurrence. For the former part, we use Stanford Named Entity Recognizer 1, while
the latter part is accomplished by employing the concept of frequent pattern mining [7].
Once the cliques are extracted, the concept miner retrieves documents of each clique
and extracts key concepts that reflect the theme of communication between members of
that clique. The output of concept miner is a list of important terms (keywords), common
1http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF-NER.shtml
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concepts, key concepts, and a brief summary.
The information visualizer is used to objectively display the identified groups and
the extracted information (e.g., keywords and concepts) by employing social networking
concepts. In the visualized social network, depicted in Figure 8.1, the nodes represent
the entities while the arcs connecting the nodes indicate the existence of a relationship
between the entities. The nodes and the arcs belonging to the same clique are labeled
with the letter Qi; the subscript i indicates the clique number. The cliques are labeled with
the chat summary, keywords, common concepts, and key concepts extracted from the chat
sessions of a specific group.
The contributions of our study are listed below.
• Analyzing unstructured data: Most previous data mining methods for criminal in-
vestigation focus on structured data, e.g., criminal police records. Our data mining
framework is designed for analyzing online messages including chat logs.
• Identifying topics dynamically: Most topic identification methods assume to have
some predefined topic categories with example documents. Our approach does
not need any training data and can be employed to dynamically assign topics to
unknown online messages based solely on the content of the documents in question.
• Adapting domain knowledge: By employing the presented approach, the investiga-
tor can incorporate domain-specific terms to obtain more specific results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.1 presents the problem
definition and Section 8.2 presents the proposed data mining framework. Section 8.3
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evaluates the proposed approach by presenting experimental results. Section 8.4 con-
cludes the chapter.
8.1 Problem Statement
Suppose an investigator has seized a computer from a suspect S. Let F be the chat log
obtained from some commonly used instant messaging systems, such as Windows Live
Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger, or IRC, in the computer. Typically, a chat log consists of
a set of chat sessions, where each chat session contains a set of text messages exchanged
between suspect S and the chat users who appear in the friend list of S. The problem
of criminal clique mining is to discover the communities (i.e., cliques) actively involved
by the suspect S in F, identify the relationships among the members in the cliques, and
extract the concepts/topics that bring the cliques together. We divide it into two subprob-
lems: clique mining and concept analysis.
8.1.1 Subproblem: Clique Mining
The subproblem of clique mining is to efficiently identify all the cliques from a given chat
log. The following intuition of clique is formulated after an extensive discussion with the
digital forensic team of a Canadian law enforcement unit. An entity can generally refer
to the name of a person, a company, or an object identified in a chat log. To ease the
discussion, we assume an entity refers to a person’s name in the rest of the chapter.
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A group of entities is considered to be a clique in a chat log if they chat with each other
frequently, or if their names appear together frequently in some minimum number of chat
sessions.
This notion of clique is more general than simply counting the number of messages sent
between two chat users. An entity e is considered to be in a clique as long as his/her name
frequently appears in the chat sessions together with some group of chat users, even if e
has never chatted with the other members in the clique or even if e is not a chat user in the
log. Capturing such generalized notion of clique is important for real-life investigation
because the members in a clique are not limited to be the chat users found in the log.
Such generalized notion often leads to new clues for further investigation. For example,
two suspected entities e1 and e2 frequently mention about the name of a third person e3
in the chat because e3 is their “boss” behind the scene. Thus, all three of them form a
clique although e3 may not be a user found in the chat log. Nonetheless, such relaxed
notion of clique may increase the chance of identifying some false positive cliques. For
example, two suspects may frequently discuss about e3 who is a celebrity. Yet, in the
context of crime investigation, an investigator would rather spend more time to filter out
false positives than to miss any potential useful evidence.
A chat log F is a collection of chat sessions ff1; : : : ;fpg. Let E(F) = fe1; : : : ;eug
denote the universe of all entities identified in F. Let E(fi) denote the set of entities
identified in a chat session fi, where E(fi)  E(F). For example, E(f5) = fe4;e5;e7g
in Table 8.1. Let Y  E(F) be a set of entities called entityset. A session fi contains an
entityset Y if Y  E(fi). An entityset that contains k entities is called a k-entityset. For
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Table 8.1: Vectors of entities representing chat sessions











example, the entityset Y = fe3;e6;e7g is a 3-entityset. The support of an entityset Y is
the percentage of chat sessions in F that contain Y . An entityset Y is a clique in F if the
support of Y is greater than or equal to some user-specified minimum support threshold.
Definition 8.1.1 (Clique). Let F be a collection of chat sessions. Let support(Y ) be the
percentage of sessions inF that contain an entitysetY , whereY  E(F). An entitysetY is
a clique inF if support(Y )min_sup, where the minimum support thresholdmin_sup is
a real number in an interval of [0, 1]. A clique containing k entities is called a k-clique.
Example 8.1.1. Consider Table 8.1. Suppose the user-specified threshold min_sup= 0:3,
which means that an entityset Y is a clique if at least 3 out of the 10 sessions contain all
entities in Y . Similarly, fe4;e5g is not a clique because it has support 2/10 = 0.2. fe2;e5g
is a 2-clique because it has support 4/10 = 0.4 and contains 2 entities. Likewise, fe5;e8g
is a 2-clique with support 3/10 = 0.3.
Definition 8.1.2 (Clique mining). Let F be a collection of chat sessions. Let min_sup
be a user-specified minimum support threshold. The subproblem of clique mining is to
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efficiently identify all cliques in F with respect to min_sup.
8.1.2 Subproblem: Concept Analysis
According to the discussions with the Canadian law enforcement unit, they encountered
some cases that involved thousands of chat users in the Windows Live Messenger chat log
on a single machine. Consequently, there could be hundreds of cliques discovered in the
chat log. The discovered cliques reflect different social aspects of the suspect, including
his/her family, friendship, work, and religion. To identify the cliques related to criminal
activities, the investigator has to analyze the content of the chat sessions of each clique.
The subproblem of concept analysis is to extract the concepts that reflect the semantic,
not just a collection of keywords, of the underlying chat conversations. To facilitate the
process of concept analysis, we assume that there exists a lexical database that captures
the conceptual hierarchies of a language, e.g., WordNet [48] for English.
Definition 8.1.3 (Concept analysis). Let Q be a set of cliques discovered in F according
to Definition 8.1.2. Let F(Qi)F be the set of chat sessions contributing to the support
of a clique Qi 2 Q. Note that the same chat session may contribute to multiple cliques.
Let H be a lexical database of the same language used in F. The subproblem of concept
analysis is to extract a set of key concepts, denoted by KC(Qi), for each discovered clique
Qi 2 Q by using the lexical database H. The key concepts represent the topics that bring
the group of entities to form a clique.
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8.2 Proposed Approach
Figure 8.2 depicts an overview of our proposed framework, which consists of three com-
ponents including clique miner, concept miner, and information visualizer. Clique miner
identifies all the cliques and their support from the given chat log. Concept miner an-
alyzes the chat sessions of each identified clique and extracts the key concepts of the
conversations. Information visualizer provides a graphical interface to allow the user to
interactively browse cliques at different abstraction levels. Each module is described sep-
arately in the following paragraphs.
8.2.1 Clique Miner
The process of clique mining consists of three steps:
(1) Dividing chat log into sessions: A session is a sequence of messages exchanged
between a group of chat users within a “logical” period of time. For instance, in the
Windows Live Messenger, a session with a person P begins when the first message is sent
between P and the suspect S, and ends when the suspect closes the chat log window with
P. Once the chat log window is closed, re-initiating the chat is considered to be a new
session with a new session ID in the log. In case of the IRC log on a public chat room, the
situation is more complicated because multiple users can chat simultaneously and there
are no logical break points for breaking a log into sessions. A simple solution is to break
the log into sessions by some predefined unit of time, say by 15 minutes. A better solution
is to look for time gap between messages and consider a new session when the time gap
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Figure 8.2: Detailed diagram of the proposed criminal information mining framework
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(2) Extracting entities: Next, we employ the existing Named Entity Recognition
(NER) tools to extract entity names from each chat session. In this study, we assume
an entity is a person, but in real-life application, an entity can also be an organization, a
location, a phone number, or a website [8]. NER systems use linguistic grammar-based
techniques and statistical models. Hand-crafted grammar-based systems typically obtain
better results, but at the cost of months of work by experienced computational linguists.
Statistical NER systems typically require a large amount of manually annotated training
data. In our study, we use Stanford Named Entity Recognizer2 software called CRF-
Classifier, which is based on the linear chain Conditional Random Field (CRF) sequence
models [41]. It is trained on the widely used named entity corpora. Other NER tools can
be employed if the document files contain non-English names as NER is not the focus of
this study. The next step, clique mining, operates on a data table consisting of records of
entities that represents entities in session, not on the actual chat log.
(3) Mining cliques: Recall that an entityset Y is any combination of entities iden-
tified in the chat log. An entityset is a clique if its support is equal to or greater than a
given threshold. A naive approach is to enumerate all possible entitysets and identify the
cliques by counting the support of each entityset in F. Yet, in case the number of iden-
tified entities jE(F)j is large, it is infeasible to enumerate all possible entitysets because
there are 2jE(F)j possible combinations. We modify the Apriori algorithm [7], which is
originally designed to extract frequent patterns from transaction data, to efficiently extract
all cliques from F. We describe the modified algorithm as follows.
Recall that E(F) denotes the universe of all entities in F, and E(fi) denotes the set
2http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF-NER.shtml
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of entities in a session fi 2F, where E(fi)E(F). Our proposed Clique Miner (CM) is a
level-wise iterative search algorithm that uses the k-cliques to explore the (k+1)-cliques.
The generation of (k+1)-cliques from k-cliques is based on the following CM property.
Property 8.2.1 (CM property). All nonempty subsets of a clique are also cliques because
support(Y 0) support(Y ) if Y 0  Y .
By definition, an entityset Y is not a clique if support(Y ) < min_sup. The above
property implies that adding an entity to an entityset that is not a clique will never make
the entityset to become a clique. Thus, if a k-entityset Y is not an entityset, then there is
no need to generate (k+ 1)-entityset Y [feg because Y [feg must not be a clique. The
closeness among the entities in a clique Y is indicated by jF(Y )j, which is the support of
Y . CM can identify all cliques by efficiently pruning the entitysets that are not cliques
based on the CM property.
Algorithm 8.3 summarizes our proposed Clique Mining Algorithm (CM). The al-
gorithm identifies the k-cliques from the (k  1)-cliques based on the CM property. The
first step is to find the set of 1-cliques, denoted by Q1. This is achieved by scanning the
chat log data table once and calculating the support count for each 1-clique. Q1 contains
all 1-cliques X with support(C j)min_sup. The set of 1-cliques is then used to identify
the set of candidate 2-cliques, denoted by Candidates2. Then the algorithm scans the
table once to count the support of each candidate X inCandidates2. All candidates X that
satisfy jF(X)j  min_sup (i.e., having support greater than or equal to a threshold) are
2-cliques, denoted by Q2. The algorithm repeats the process of generating Qk from Qk 1
and stops if Candidatek is empty.
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Input: Chat log F
Input: Minimum support threshold min_sup
Output: Cliques Q= fQ1[ [Qkg
Output: Chat sessions F(X), 8X 2 Q
1: Q1  fe j e 2 E(F)L support(feg) min_supg;
2: for (k = 2; Qk 1 6= /0; k++) do
3: Candidatesk  Qk 1 1 Qk 1;
4: for all entityset Y 2Candidatesk do
5: if 9Y 0  Y such that Y 0 =2 Qk 1 then
6: Candidatesk  Candidatesk Y ;
7: end if
8: end for
9: F(X) /0, 8X 2Candidatesk;
10: for all chat session f 2F do
11: for all entityset X 2Candidatesk do





17: Qk  fX j X 2CandidateskLjF(X)j  min_supg;
18: end for
19: Q= fQ1[ [Qkg;
20: return Q and F(X), 8X 2 Q;
Algorithm 3: Clique Mining Algorithm
Lines 9-17 describe the procedure of scanning the data table and keeping track of
the associated document of each clique X in Candidatesk. Each candidate entityset X is
looked up in the entities of each chat session E(f). If a match is found, the chat session
f is added to the set F(X). If the support jF(X)j is greater than or equal to the user-
specified minimum threshold min_sup, then X is added to Qk, the set of k-cliques with k
members. The algorithm terminates when no more candidates can be generated or when
none of the candidate entitysets pass the min_sup threshold. The algorithm returns all
cliques Q= fQ1[ [Qkg, except for the 1-cliques, with their associated chat sessions.
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The following example shows how to efficiently extract all frequent patterns.
Example 8.2.1. Consider Table 8.1 with min_sup= 0:3. First, identify all the entities by
scanning the table once to obtain the support of every entity. The entities having support
0:3 are 1-cliques Q1 = ffe2g;fe5g;fe7g;fe8gg. Then join Q1 with itself, i.e., Q1 1Q1, to
generate the candidate setCandidates2= ffe2;e5g;fe2;e7g;fe2;e8g;fe5;e7g;fe5;e8g;fe7;e8gg
and scan the table once to obtain the support of every entityset in Candidates2. Next,
identify the 2-cliques Q2 = ffe2;e5g;fe5;e7g;fe5;e8gg. Similarly, perform Q2 1 Q2 to
generate Candidates3 = fe5;e7;e8g and determine Q3 = /0. Finally, the algorithm returns
Q2 and the associated chat sessions of every clique in Q2.
8.2.2 Concept Miner
This phase is to analyze the chat sessions and summarize the content into some high-level
topics to facilitate effective browsing in the visualization phase. The concept miner ex-
tracts the semantic from the set of associated chat sessions F(X) of every clique X 2 Q
identified by Algorithm 8.3. It is important to identify the underlying semantic of the
written words as many perpetrators use different obfuscation and deception techniques
to covertly conduct their illegitimate activities. Understanding the semantic and contex-
tual meaning of online messages is difficult because they are unstructured and are usually
written in para language. The abbreviations, special symbols, and visual metaphors used
in malicious messages convey special meaning and are meaningful in some specific con-
text.
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Specifically, the concept miner extracts three notions from F(X): Keywords are
frequent words extracted from F(X). Common concepts are high-level topics shared by
the chat sessions in F(X). Key concepts are the top ranked concepts by importance.
Input: Cliques Q from Algorithm 8.3
Input: Associated chat sessions F(X);8X 2 Q
Input: Search terms ST
Input: Keyword threshold a
Input: Maximum number of key concepts b
Output: Keywords KW (X);8X 2 Q
Output: Common concepts CC(X);8X 2 Q
Output: Key concepts KC(X);8X 2 Q
Output: Miscellaneous information MiscIn f o(X);8X 2 Q
1: for all X 2 Q do
2: KW (X) ft j t 2F(X) L t 2 ST or t with top a t f_id f (t)};
3: Group the terms in KW (X) into clusters fW1; : : : ;Wmg;
4: CC(X) /0;
5: for all cluster Wi 2 fW1; : : : ;Wmg do
6: for all term tx 2Wi do
7: SS(tx) synsets of tx from WordNet;
8: for all sense senx 2 SS(tx) do
9: RS(senx) related synsets of senx from WordNet;
10: OS(senx) RS(senx)\RS(seny);8seny 2 SS(ty), where 8ty 2Wi; tx 6= ty;
11: end for




15: for all common concept cc 2CC(X) do
16: Score(cc) 0;
17: for all term t 2 KW (X) do
18: if t 2 cc then





24: KC(X) fcc j cc 2CC(X) with top b Score(cc)g;
25: MiscIn f o(X) various information identified in F(X);
26: end for
27: return KW (X),CC(X), KC(X), and MiscIn f o(X);8X 2 Q;
Algorithm 4: Concept Mining Algorithm
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Algorithm 8.4 provides an overview of the Concept Mining Algorithm. For every
clique X 2 Q, we extract the keywords from F(X), group the keywords into clusters
fW1;    ;Wmg by semantics, extract the common conceptsCC among the keywords within
each cluster Wi, and finally identify the most important ones, which are the key concepts.
We elaborate these five steps as follows.
Table 8.2: Synsets and direct hypernyms of selected terms retrieved from WordNet
Term Synsets => Direct Hypernyms
snow 1. snow, snowfall – (precipitation falling from clouds in the form of ice crystals)
=> precipitation, downfall – (the falling to earth of any form of water (rain
or snow or hail or sleet or mist))
2. snow – (a layer of snowflakes (white crystals of frozen water) covering the ground)
=> layer – (a relatively thin sheetlike expanse or region lying over or under another)
3. Snow, C. P. Snow, Charles Percy Snow, Baron Snow of Leicester – (English writer of
novels about moral dilemmas)
=> writer, author – (writes (books or stories or articles or the like) professionally
(for pay))
4. snow, coke, blow, nose candy, C – (street names for cocaine)
=> cocaine, cocain – (a narcotic (alkaloid) extracted from coca leaves; used as
a surface anesthetic or taken for pleasure)
coke 1. coke – (carbon fuel produced by distillation of coal)
=> fuel – (a substance that can be consumed to produce energy; “more fuel is
needed during the winter months”)
2. coke, Coca Cola – (Coca Cola is a trademarked cola)
=> cola, dope – (carbonated drink flavored with extract from kola nuts
(‘dope’ is a southernism in the United States))
3. coke, blow, nose candy, snow, C – (street names for cocaine)
=> cocaine, cocain – (a narcotic (alkaloid) extracted from coca leaves;
used as a surface anesthetic or taken for pleasure)
nose candy 1. coke, blow, nose candy, snow, C – (street names for cocaine)
=> cocaine, cocain – (a narcotic (alkaloid) extracted from coca leaves;
used as a surface anesthetic or taken for pleasure)
cocaine 1. cocaine, cocain – (a narcotic (alkaloid) extracted from coca leaves; used as a
surface anesthetic or taken for pleasure
=> hard drug – (a narcotic that is considered relatively strong and likely
to cause addiction)
We first describe some standard text mining preprocessing procedures for apply-
ing to the input chat log F. Tokenization involves breaking a sentence into a sequence
of words called terms. Stop word removal is applied to remove the context-independent
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words, which do not contribute to identifying the semantic of the text. Stop words include
function words (e.g., ‘is’, ‘my’, ‘yours’, and ‘below’), short words (e.g., words containing
1-3 characters), punctuation, and non-informative symbols and characters [4, 121]. Stem-
ming involves converting different forms of the same word into the root word [81, 86].
For instance, the words compute, computed, computer, and computing are converted into
the root word compute. After preprocessing, each chat session f 2 F is represented as a
vector of terms [93].
(1) Extracting keywords (Line 2): There are two kinds of keywords. A term t in
F(X) is a keyword of X , denoted by KW (X), if it appears in the list of user-specified
special terms or if it occurs frequently in many chat sessions of a clique but not frequently
in the chat sessions of other cliques.
• Some special terms, though may not appear frequently, are important for crime
investigation. For instance, certain crime-relevant street terms such as marijuana,
heroin, or opium are relevant and therefore requires more attention even though they
may appear only once. To identify such special terms, we allow the investigator to
specify a list of special terms, denoted by ST . In our implementation, the terms are
collected from different law enforcement agencies and online sources.3.
• A term is important in F(X) if it appears frequently in the chat session F(X) of
clique X 2 Q but not frequently in chat session F(Y ) of other clique Y 2 Q, where
X 6= Y . Intuitively, these terms can help differentiate the topic of a clique from
others. To identify them, we compute the t f   id f of every term as discussed
3http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/streetterms/
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in Section 3.4 and add the top a of them to KW (X), where a is a user-specified
threshold.
The sentences containing the keywords are key sentences that can be used for sum-
mary [114].
(2) Clustering keywords by semantics (Line 3): The objective of this step is to group
the keywords into clusters fW1; : : : ;Wmg such that the keywords in the same cluster have
high similarity and the keywords in different clusters have low similarity. In the literature
of natural language processing, the semantic similarity is called the paradigmatic similar-
ity and relatedness is known as syntagmatic similarity [10]. Two words are paradigmati-
cally similar if they can be substituted by each other in a specific context without changing
too much the semantic of the sentence. For instance, the word price can be replaced by
cost in the sentence “The price of the monitor is high.” Two words are syntagmatically
similar if they often appear together, for example, the words knife and cut often appear
together.
We employ agglomerative hierarchical clustering method to create the clusters [97].
The general idea is to compare every pair of terms in KW (X) and iteratively merge the
pairs with highest similarity. The similarity is measured by the semantic relatedness of
word senses according to WordNet. Specifically, we employ theWordNet-Similarity soft-
ware 4 to compute the paradigmatic and syntagmatic similarity. Note, it is important to
first cluster the words by semantics; otherwise, it will be difficult to find common concepts
in the next step.
4http://search.cpan.org/dist/WordNet-Similarity/
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(3) Extracting common concepts (Lines 4-14): Next, we want to identify some com-
mon concepts that cover the semantic of the keywords of each cluster Wi 2 fW1; : : : ;Wmg
by making use of the WordNet. In WordNet, every term t is associated with a set of senses
called synset. Each sense contains a set of terms that represents the interpretation of the
term t in a specific context. Consider Table 8.2 for example. The term coke has three
senses (synsets). In the context of drug trafficking, coke means cocaine, but it means
drink or carbon fuel in different contexts. Below, we describe how to select the most
suitable sense of each term based on the context described by other terms in the same
cluster.
We perform the following operations for every keyword tx in each cluster Wi. First,
we obtain the related synsets denoted by RS(senx), including the synonyms, direct hy-
pernyms, and entailments for every sense senx of tx. Second, we identify the overlapping
related synsets of senx and of every other term ty in the same cluster Wi. The overlapping
synsets are denoted by OS(senx). Finally, we select the best sense, denoted by BestSen,
that has the largest number of overlapping synset, and add OS(BestSen) to the common
concepts of clique X , denoted by CC(X). Table 8.2 lists the senses (synsets) of some
terms followed by a direct hypernym of the sense. Suppose we find the keywords coke
and snow in some chat sessions of a clique. By intersecting their related synsets including
the direct hypernyms, we can identify a common concept {coke, blow, nose candy, snow,
C}, which has a direct hypernym {hard drug}. Without considering the terms coke and
snow in the correct context, the terms will probably be misinterpreted.5
5We use the Java API for WordNet Searching (JAWS) http://lyle.smu.edu/~tspell/jaws/ to
retrieve the synsets from WordNet.
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(4) Identifying key concepts (Lines 15-24): According to the evaluation, the seman-
tic of the chat sessions associated with a clique is well-captured by the common concepts
extracted. However, in real application, there are too many of them. It is impractical to
display all the common concepts in the interactive user interface for browsing the cliques.
Thus, we rank the common concepts, and display the top b of them, where b is a user-
specified threshold. Intuitively, a common concept is a key concept in X if its senses
contain a keyword found in the clique X . The importance of a term is computed by the
t f_id f value. The importance of a common concept is the sum of the t f_id f values of
the matched terms normalized by the number of terms in the common concept.
(5) Extracting miscellaneous information (Line 25): This step extracts some rele-
vant information, such as phone number, addresses, e-mails, website URLs, from the chat
sessions of every clique. This task can be easily achieved by matching with some regular
expressions.
8.2.3 Information Visualizer
The objective of the information visualizer is to provide an interactive user interface to
browse the discovered cliques and the relevant information. In general, a clique can be
displayed as a graph, in which the nodes represent the entities, the edges represent the
relationship, and the lengths of edges represent the closeness between the entities. Yet,
the visualization task in this study is challenging when the number of discovered cliques
is large. Recall that Property 8.2.1 states that every subset of a clique is also a clique,
so the discovered cliques in fact represent multiple layers of relationships. Each clique
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has its own closeness, keywords, common concepts, key concepts, and other relevant
information. We have designed an intuitive interface by integrating a data visualization
tool, called prefuse [54], which allows the user to drill-down and roll-up on a clique.
Prefuse is a collection of software tools, written in Java, and is used for creating interactive
data visualization solutions. See the next section for more details.
8.3 Experiments and Discussion
We have four objectives in this section. (1) To verify if the cliques, extracted by the clique
miner, represent a meaningful group of individuals in real-world and to measure the effect
of minimum support threshold on the number of cliques. (2) To evaluate whether or not
the concept miner can precisely identify the important keywords, common concepts, and
key concepts from the chat conversation of each extracted clique. (3) To quantitatively
measure the efficiency of the developed framework in terms of the total execution time
versus user-defined minimum support threshold. (4) To measure the scalability of the
presented framework by plotting the execution time viz-a-viz data size.
Figure 8.3: A sample screen shot of the presented framework
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Finding a real-life dataset for evaluating the proposed approach is not trivial due
to privacy issues. Most law enforcement agencies and private organizations, though have
access to criminal data, but they can not make it public due to legal constraints. For in-
stance, the chat corpus, collected by Perverted Justice 6, is a rich source of predominantly
cybercrime related data and is available online but it cannot be used for analysis without
the consent of the people concerned. These chat logs mostly contain cyber predatory and
cyber bullying conversation between predators and the pseudo-victims. Therefore, our re-
search team objectively creates MSN chat logs in which one of the team member pretends
to be the primary suspect chatting with different users. In the given chat conversation, one
of our member behaves as a pseudo-drug dealer by using street names of some drugs in
his conversation with the primary suspect.
In the first set of experiments, the clique miner takes the given chat log and displays
the identified cliques. Figure 8.3, representing the screen shot of the framework, displays
the graphical view of the discovered cliques. By using the GUI of the developed frame-
work, the user can identify a clique by moving the mouse on the figure. The group of
entities representing one clique are highlighted together. In the figure, ten cliques, each
containing 2-3 entities are shown. The central node in each clique denotes the primary
suspect and the peripheral nodes represent the entities associated with the suspect. The
arcs connecting the entities indicate the existence of relationship between the entities.
The clique containing entities BANG54321033, EDDYSPHARMACY8, and CHARLIE
is interesting as the chat conversation of its member contains drug-related terms, e.g.,
grass, pot dope, skunk, and snow. We have manually compared the extracted entities and
6http://perverted-justice.com/
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the discovered cliques with the textual content of the given chat sessions. We found that
more than 80% of the cliques are correctly identified with a few false positive cases. This




















Figure 8.4: Effect of minimum support on number of cliques
In the second set of experiments, we incrementally change the user-defined min-
imum support threshold to check its effect on the number of cliques, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.4. The number of cliques extracted from the given chat log spans from 155 to 8
for minimum support ranging from 0.33% to 3.33%. The number of cliques is inversely
proportional to the minimum support, i.e., increasing the support will cause a decrease
in the number of cliques. The number of cliques sharply drops by changing the support
threshold from 0.33% to 0.66% for the chat log in question. The curve becomes almost
flat when the support count is increased to 1.33%. There is always a trade off between the
two parameters and can be adjusted according to the specific requirements of an investi-
gation.
The third set of experiments is performed to evaluate the concept analysis function-
ality of the presented framework. The concept miner retrieves the chat log of each clique,
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discovered in the clique mining step, and extract the keywords, common concepts, and key
concepts from each chat collection separately. Figure 8.3 visualizes the extracted cliques
and the concept analysis results associated with each clique. The drill-down and roll-up
capability of the framework, allows the user to browse the cliques and the summary of
their conversation.
We found the concept analysis summary of the chat log belonging to the clique
comprising BANG54321033, EDDYSPHARMACY8, and CHARLIE interesting. The
extracted keywords including blow, snow, coke, dope, and gage, which are the street
terms used to represent cocaine, a narcotic. The concept miner also identifies the words
including system, changing, and potential as keywords, which happened due to the high
frequency of these words. The words ‘cocaine’ and ‘cocain’, identifies as the key con-
cepts, represent the topic of chat conversation of the aforementioned clique. The other
extracted information such as the message summary and the common concepts are not
shown in the figure for simplicity. By comparing the extracted keywords and the related
key concepts with the WordNet conceptual hierarchy (shown in Table 8.2), suggests that
the concept miner can correctly identify the topic of online messages.
The slide bars, denoted by NBodyForce in Figure 8.3, are used by the user for
setting the parameters. The user needs to specify the minimum support threshold and the
size of the chat dataset.
The fourth set of experiments is employed to measure the runtime efficiency of
our framework. For this, we have used MSN chat logs with an initial size of 2.59MB,
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voluntarily contributed by our team members. The value of total execution time (mea-
sured in seconds) is plotted against the minimum support, as shown in Figure 8.5. The
value of minimum support ranges from 0.33% to 3.33%. The total execution time is
maximum, i.e., 53 seconds for minimum support 0.66% and decreases as the minimum






















Figure 8.5: Efficiency [Execution time vs. Minimum support]
Generally, a software tool is considered scalable provided its execution time in-
creases linearly as the size of input data increases. However, if the execution time grows
exponentially with the increase in the data size, then the tool is not scalable. To mea-
sure the scalability, we incrementally change the size of the dataset (measured in terms of
the total chat sessions) while keeping the minimum support constant at 0.67% in clique
miner. Initially, we use a dataset of 1000 sessions, which is incremented by an equal
interval size of 2000 sessions up to a maximum size of 10000 sessions. Depicted in Fig-
ure 8.6, we measure the execution time of each component of our framework separately.
Finally, we add up all the individual scores together to obtain the total execution time of
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the entire framework code. From this graph, we can clearly see a linear increase in the
execution time of each component as well as the sum total of all the components. The
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Figure 8.6: Scalability [Execution time vs. Data size]
8.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a criminal information mining framework for extract-
ing forensically relevant information from suspicious online messages. The framework
is designed to take online messages as input and provides a set of cliques and the topic
of discussion of the chat conversation of each clique as output. The experimental result
on a given chat log suggests that the proposed framework can precisely identify the perti-
nent cliques and the perceived meaning of the messages exchanged between members of
each clique. The framework meets the standard requirements of efficiency and scalabil-
ity. The accuracy of the framework can be improved by developing a precise and efficient
knowledge-base of the commonly used cybercrime terms. Moreover, the result can be
improved by employing sophisticated techniques in the preprocessing step and by using
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a dataset that is predominantly malicious.
Moreover, the current version of WordNet contains limited number of cybercrime-
related words and therefore it needs to be extended to include more terms. Similarly, to
extend the proposed framework to support languages other than English, the need is to
develop a WordNet-like lexical database, e.g., EuroWordNet.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the thesis. First, we give a summary of our presented framework
and main contributions of this thesis followed by some pointers for future research.
9.1 Thesis Summary
We have developed and implemented a forensic analysis framework to help an investigator
and expert witness collect empirical evidence by automatically analyzing large archives of
suspicious online messages. The analysis can be performed on the header content as well
as on the textual body of a message. To perform header analysis, we have implemented
some state-of-the-art techniques in our framework; however, our study has focused on
the message body. The message body usually contains two types of content: all-purpose
content-independent words and content-specific or content-dependent words. Content-
independent words, called authorial attributes, are collected from previously written mes-
sages of suspects to address the problem of anonymity. The content-specific part is used
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to extract knowledge relevant to a cybercrime investigation. Therefore, the presented
framework consists of two main modules: authorship analysis and criminal information
mining.
In the authorship analysis module, we introduce a novel approach of authorship
analysis and formulate a new notion of writeprint based on the concept of frequent pattern
mining. Unlike the physical fingerprint, we do not claim that the writeprint can uniquely
distinguish every individual in the world, but our experimental results strongly suggest
that the writeprint defined in this study is accurate enough to uniquely identify the writing
style of one individual among a limited number of suspects. Our notion of writeprint has
two special properties that make it different from the traditional notion of writeprint in the
literature [4, 5].
First, the combination of feature items forming the writeprint of a suspect is dynam-
ically generated based solely on the embedded patterns in his/her messages. This flexi-
bility allows us to succinctly model the writeprint of different suspects by using different
combinations of feature items. In contrast, the traditional notion of writeprint considers
one feature at a time without considering all combinations.
Second, every frequent stylometric pattern in our notion of writeprint captures a
piece of writing pattern that can be found only in one suspect’s messages, but not in other
suspects’ messages. A cybercrime investigator could precisely point out such matched
patterns in the anonymous message to support the conclusion of authorship disputes. In
contrast, the traditional classification method, e.g., decision tree, attempts to use the same
set of features to capture the writeprint of different suspects. It is quite possible that
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the classifier would capture some common writing patterns and the investigator could
unintentionally use the common patterns to draw a wrong conclusion on authorship. Our
notion of writeprint avoids such problem and, therefore, provides more convincing and
reliable evidence.
Our method produces acceptable results in resolving the three types of authorial
disputes, i.e., identification, characterization, and verification. The proposed method is
effective even if there exists only a few training samples or even no training samples. The
proposed data mining approach can tackle the problem of stylistic variation by capturing
the sub-stylistic features of a suspect. Similarly, our experiments suggest that text mes-
sages can be divided into different groups based on writing styles by applying stylometry-
based clustering.
Is the accuracy demonstrated in our experiments good enough for criminal inves-
tigations? According to our discussion with a law enforcement unit, having 70%-90%
identification accuracy is acceptable in an investigation, especially in the early phase
when a crime investigator often has very few clues to begin with. Yet, we emphasize
that our proposed methods cannot (and should not) substitute for the role of an expert
witness in a court of law. The methods can speed up the analysis process and can iden-
tify some less obvious combination of stylometric patterns, but an expert witness still has
to apply his/her expert knowledge to verify the consistency of the extracted results with
other available evidence.
By employing the criminal information mining component of our approach, an in-
vestigator would be able to extract forensically relevant information from large archives of
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suspicious online messages. The experimental results on real-life dataset suggest that the
implemented techniques can be used to identify suspicious entities and their hidden rela-
tionships from the messages in question. Further, the developed method is able to identify
the contextual meaning of the written words, and thus is effective in retrieving messages
containing malicious material. Our method can be applied for query expansion in cases
where the user has a limited number of search words or her knowledge is limited in the do-
main of cybercrime investigation. To evaluate whether or not the implemented approach
meets the standard requirements of efficiency and scalability, we measured these charac-
teristics in terms of the total execution time. Finally, we present the extracted knowledge
in a more intuitive way to facilitate the decision-making process.
We would like to share our technical expertise acquired through our team work with
the local law enforcement agencies. Cybercrime investigation is complex, often a combi-
nation of technical, legal, and resource issues. To develop an effective multidisciplinary
approach, it is important to educate investigators about the latest data mining technology
and the tools available for crime investigation. When investigators encounter problems in
criminal information mining, as presented in this study, their initial response is often to
solve the problem manually or to conduct a simple search using general-purpose search
engines. In fact, alternative techniques, such as the data mining solution presented in this
study, are available to help significantly reduce the investigation time.
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9.2 Future Work
There is still a long way to go to develop a comprehensive, reliable forensic analysis ap-
proach before it can be widely accepted in courts of law. The small size, unstructured
layout, and informal contents of online messages make the analysis process more chal-
lenging.
Future research in authorship analysis can be focused on the following three areas.
(1) Our current version of AuthorMiner2 relies on an investigator to divide the mes-
sages into groups such that sub-writeprints can be derived. As a result, the identification
result varies depending on the subjective grouping. One possible improvement is to devise
a clustering method to group the training messages by sub-writeprints. (2) Our current
approach of AuthorCharacterizer utilizes blog postings to infer characteristics of an e-
mail author. Though our approach demonstrates some initial success, some stylometric
features of e-mails are not applicable to blog postings. To further improve the character-
ization accuracy on e-mails, one research direction is to collect a large volume of sample
e-mails from authors with different backgrounds, extract the writeprints, and then use the
writeprints to infer the characteristics of potential suspects based on their e-mails.
(3) Our study shows that content-specific keywords can play an important role in
style mining when used in specific contexts like cybercrime investigation. Therefore, it
is imperative to develop a sound technique for identifying effective and significant key-
words. Feature optimization for selecting the most appropriate attributes among the avail-
able approximately 1000 writing style features is another potential research direction.
Addressing language multiplicity is another research direction in analyzing online
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messages. The Internet has become a common venue for cybercriminals coming from
different regions and ethnic groups, speaking different languages, and following different
norms and traditions. Therefore, it is very difficult to understand the underlying meaning
of conversation between the perpetrators. Similarly, the ever increasing number of new
obfuscation techniques used by perpetrators for hiding their suspicious online communi-
cations makes analysis of electronic discourse more difficult. Similarly, more interesting
results can be obtained by using the proposed approach on real-time online traffic con-
taining malicious messages.
To develop an effective investigation approach, an expert witness needs to acquire
an up-to-date knowledge of innovative data mining and language processing techniques.
Similarly, the techniques developed for analysis of structured documents are not very ef-
fective for analyzing online messages. Therefore, there is a need to design techniques that
best fit the analysis of electronic discourse, the so-called written conversation, produced
in different languages.
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Appendix I: Function Words
a an at as above are about
because be in some nor but us
including both upon inside of used someone
we they their that by into off
although once than what do one its
the when each opposite less where and
or whether little our these which every
whom everyday many this anyone who everything
most my per from whoever with past
few must though plus following own those
him no should unlike yes below nobody
if none so up your regarding toward
without need several under worth before her
between such is on latter onto enough
anybody over more following around plenty for
after am any nothing somebody all he
she it something via can beside behind
whatever among down either like them would
lots outside while will till through to
whose me everyone much anything same towards
since until you within have near neither
unless i another
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Appendix II: Gender-specific Features
1. No. of words ending with able / W
2. No. of words ending with al / W
3. No. of words ending with ful / W
4. No. of words ending with ible / W
5. No. of words ending with ic / W
6. No. of words ending with ive / W
7. No. of words ending with less / W
8. No. of words ending with ly / W
9. No. of words ending with ous / W
10. No. of occurrences of ‘sorry’ / W
11. No. of occurrences of ‘apology’ / W
where the letter ‘W’ denotes the total number of words or tokens.
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